




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# Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago

## A Case Study of the July 2009 JW Marriott & Ritz-Carlton Bombings in Jakarta, Indonesia



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“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”  
-Edmund Burke

## THE CASE STUDY

This case study examines the history of the Indonesian terrorist network al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah (JI) and its most deadly and violent splinter cell Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, particularly through the lens of the 17 July 2009 terrorist bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. Focus is given the history of both organizations, their leadership, strategies and tactics, countermeasures employed by Indonesian terrorism authorities and lessons learned from a decade of combating radical Islamists.

Great appreciation is afforded Mr. Muhammad Iqbal of the Indonesian Student Association at Texas A&M University for providing the author intimate knowledge of daily life in Indonesia, the efforts of regional police and counterterrorism officials to disrupt the JI network and the perception of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad by local residents. Gratitude is also afforded The International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research for sharing myriad photographs and documents from their on-the-scene research and investigation.

## THE TIMELINE

**10 July-** Amir Ibrahim “Abdullah” reserves a hotel room for suicide bombers Dani Dwi Pratama and Nana Ikhwan Maulana under the false name Nuri Hasdi.

**15 July-** At 3pm, Dani Dwi Pratama checks into the room at the JW Marriott. He is assigned room 1808 and pays USD\$330 cash.

**15 July-** For reasons unknown, both the Marriott and Ritz Carlton continue to operate under “threat condition red”, the highest level of security.

**15 July-** Pratama and Maulana meet with Ibrohim—the florist who worked in a gift shop in the tunnel that joined the two hotels—to ensure all plans are in order. Final review of the hotel and target sites within is conducted.

**16 July-** Five bombs are smuggled into the Ritz Carlton through the hotel's employee entrance and loading dock area using a vehicle rented by Ibrohim, circumventing all security mechanisms in place. Each bomber would carry two bombs and the fifth would be left on a timer in room 1808.

**16 July-** Pratama and Maulana continue to lay low and prepare themselves spiritually for berjihad.

**17 July-** At 7:47am, the first of two explosions rocks the Mega Kuningan District from the lobby lounge in the JW Marriot.

**17 July-** At 7:51am, CCTV shows Maulana crossing the Ritz Carlton lobby enroute to the Airlangga Restaurant.

**17 July-** At 7:57am, seconds after Maulana places his bag beneath a table and walks away, the second explosion occurs in the Airlangga Restaurant in the Ritz Carlton.

**17 July-** The explosions left around 55 people injured and 9 killed. Among those killed were 1 New Zealander, 1 Indonesian, 2 Dutch, and 3 Australians.

## CASE STUDY BACKGROUND—A DECADE OF DESTRUCTION

The Republic of Indonesia, located just northwest of Australia and directly south of Malaysia, is an archipelago nation comprised of 17,508 islands. While it is the fourth most populated country in the world, with more than 240 million inhabitants, it is the nation with the largest Muslim population in the world. Its national capital, Jakarta, is located on the island of Java and has been the site of three of the five major terrorist attacks in Indonesia since 2001.<sup>1</sup> All five attacks have been tied to an Islamo-fascist<sup>2</sup> terrorist organization in Indonesia known as *al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah (JI)*.

The first attack occurred on 12 October 2002, when three bombs exploded in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali, located just east of Java. The attacks were the deadliest acts of terrorism in Indonesia's history, killing 202 people and injuring another 209.<sup>3</sup> One bomb was carried in the backpack of a suicide bomber and detonated outside of a nightclub; a second large car bomb was also detonated outside of a nightclub, and the smallest of the three was exploded outside the U.S. consulate in Denpasar, causing only minor structural damage to the consulate's façade.

In August of 2003, Indonesia witnessed its first attack on a Western hotel—a hotel which regularly hosted U.S. diplomatic functions. On that 5 August, a terrorist suicide bomber detonated a car bomb in front of the JW Marriot lobby, killing 12 and wounding 150.<sup>4</sup> The third

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<sup>1</sup> Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. *Republic of Indonesia: Profile of Indonesia*.

[http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=112&Itemid=1722](http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=112&Itemid=1722)

<sup>2</sup> Islamo-fascism is neither a loose nor an improvised concept, as its creator Stephen Schwarz noted in 2006; it is imperialistic, totalitarian, paramilitary and is distinguished from the broader category of extreme right-wing politics by its willingness to defy public civility and openly violate the law. See: Schwarz, Stephen. *What is Islamofascism? A History of the Word from the First Westerner to Use It*. The Weekly Standard. 08-16-2006.

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/593ajdua.asp>

<sup>3</sup> Australian Federal Police. *International Activities: Bali bombings 2002*. 05-02-2008. (All dates: mm/dd/yyyy).

[http://afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous\\_operations/bali\\_bombings\\_2002](http://afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bombings_2002)

<sup>4</sup> Global Security. *JW Marriott Hotel Bombing*. Homeland Security: Al Qaeda Operations. 04-27-2005.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/marriot.htm>

attack was against the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004. This attack once again utilized a large car bomb, approximately one-ton, killed five people and injured 150.<sup>5</sup> The fourth attack occurred again in Bali on 1 October 2005 and consisted of three exploded bombs and three bombs which failed to explode. The death toll was 20.<sup>6</sup> The fifth attack, against the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in the central Jakarta business district in July of 2009, is the focus of this case study.

The four attacks preceding the 2009 Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings were directly tied to the leadership of Jemaah Islamiyah and defined a consistent pattern of tradecraft employed during their operations: The targeting of Western icons, often diplomatic in nature; the use of multiple explosions; a propensity for car bombs; and a preference for suicide bombings. These tactics are literal excerpts from the al-Qa'ida training manual and denote the intimacy of a relationship that began in 1998 when JI founders Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network.<sup>7</sup>

Desiring to install an Islamic State in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, in 2002 JI sought to exploit the rabid anti-American sentiment among the Muslim world and began a violent campaign to drive the West out of the region.<sup>8</sup> Harnessing the vitriolic anti-Christian sentiment that stemmed from the region's on-going Maluku Conflict, from Osama Bin Laden's call to wage jihad against the West, from al-Qa'ida's litany of attacks against the U.S., and from the United States' new War on ~~Terrorism~~ Islam, Bashir and Sungkar drew upon a radicalized

<sup>5</sup> Dodd, Mark. *\$415m for High-security, Bomb-proof Jakarta Embassy*. 06-19-2009.

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/m-for-high-security-bomb-proof-jakarta-embassy/story-0-1225737435236>

<sup>6</sup> Australian Associated Press, The. *Timeline of a Terrorist*. The Herald Sun. 08-08-2009.

<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/timeline-of-a-terrorist/story-e6frf7jo-1225759324650>

<sup>7</sup> Van Bruinessen, Martin. *Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia*. Institute of Political and International Studies. 07-01-2002.

[http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies\\_islamic\\_radicalism.htm#\\_ftn1](http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm#_ftn1)

<sup>8</sup> Pavlova, Elena. *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI*. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. 11-14-2006, p. 11.

<http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/WorkingPapers/WP117.pdf>

Muslim base they had procured while preaching at a boarding school in central Java—a school they had founded. A top lieutenant for JI, Noordin Mohammad Top, who also served as a charismatic fundraiser and recruiter for the network, worked closely with Azahari Bin Husin—a Ph.D. in engineering and JI’s military chief—to launch JI’s inaugural attack in Bali in 2002. By early 2006, however, after a majority of JI leadership had been arrested or killed by Indonesian counterterrorism authorities, including Azahari Bin Husin, Noordin Top broke away from JI to form a more violent splinter cell known as Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, or “Organization for the Base of Jihad.”<sup>9</sup> It was Top, and Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, who designed, planned and executed the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings on 17 July 2009 in Jakarta.

#### **TANZIM QAEDAT AL-JIHAD – PARTICIPANTS, CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS**

While attending the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia for his master’s degree, Noordin Mohammed Top, a native Malaysian with higher education in accounting, often visited the nearby boarding school that Bashir and Sugkar had founded to listen to its faculty lecture. Impressed and impassioned, it was not long before Top befriended a host of the school’s professors, who also constituted the best known JI bombers—Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Faturrahman al-Ghozi, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, and Azhari—and by early 1998 Noordin had willingly joined the ranks of JI.<sup>10</sup>

As aforementioned, by 2005 recruits and resources were dwindling within JI after Indonesian authorities cracked down on the network’s existence. Instead of committing himself to the revitalization of Jemaah Islamiyah, Top took the opportunity to launch his own organization, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, and commit his energies to its development and

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<sup>9</sup> STRATFOR. *Noordin Top’s New Group*. Australia/Oceania: Indonesia: JI. 02-01-2006.

[http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/50884/indonesia\\_ji\\_militant\\_noordin\\_tops\\_new\\_group?ip\\_auth\\_redirect=1](http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/50884/indonesia_ji_militant_noordin_tops_new_group?ip_auth_redirect=1)

<sup>10</sup> International Crisis Group. *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Network*. Crisis Group Asia Report #114. 05-05-2006.

expansion. Though certainly a splinter of JI, it was an organization that more closely reflected his personal religious beliefs in Salafi Islam, his interpretations of the Quran, and his opinions on how to put that faith into practice—through *berjihad*, the Indonesian term for Islamic jihad.

In the wake of Indonesia's anti-terrorism campaign following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S., JI also found it difficult to operate openly while preaching the virtues of Salafi Islam. As a result of this challenging atmosphere, and with the native populace growing increasingly dissatisfied with more Muslims being killed during *berjihad* than Westerners, JI's leadership toned down their radical message and stopped advocating violence—on Indonesian soil; a remarkably important caveat. For Noordin Top, this compromise was a capitulation from what he perceived as already-faltering leadership, an infidelity to the faith, and an aberration from the mission at hand. Not to be deterred, Top launched the even more violent *Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad* with the intent of truly embracing al-Qa'ida's philosophy by not only refusing to fold under pressure but also electing to amplify the efficacy and destructiveness of *berjihad*.

To assist Noordin in his Islamo-fascist endeavor, and particularly in the planning of the 2009 Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings, were his two colleagues, Ibrohim and Saifudin Zuhri bin Jaelani Irsyad—a.k.a. Saifudin Jaelani. Ibrohim had been recruited by Jaelani—his brother-in-law and long time JI member—in 2000. As a florist with stores in both the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Ibrohim would be an invaluable asset to have on the inside. Jaelani, a Yemeni-trained preacher with suspected links to Middle East terror groups, had been calling for the destruction of Australia, the U.S. and Indonesia for many years prior to the 2009 attack;<sup>11</sup> and, like Noordin Top, Jaelani was a charismatic preacher who served as a key recruiter for *Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad*. Jaelani is believed to have recruited the two suicide bombers for the July 2009 plot—

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<sup>11</sup> Australian Free Press. *Jakarta Attackers in Turmoil*. World News Australia. 10-13-2009. <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1110241/Jakarta-attackers-in-turmoil>

Dani Dwi Pratama and Nana Ikhwan Maulana. It is also believed by Indonesian police that Jaelani later assumed control of Top's group after Top was fatally shot during a police raid in September of 2009.

Of the two suicide bombers, Dani Dwi Pratama, an 18 year-old Indonesian Muslim from Bogor, was assigned to blow up the JW Marriot.<sup>12</sup> Nana Ikhwan Maulana, a 28 year-old from Pandeglang, Banten, was designated to commit jihad against the Ritz-Carlton. The age and gender of these two jihadists further corroborates a historical profile for radical Muslim extremists: young [16 to 35 years of age], single, little to no higher education and male. Additionally, as evidenced by video-footage collected from Top's computer following his death, the teenage bomber Dani Dwi Pratama was seen in front of the hotels in the days before the attack saying, "This is not suicide, this is a good deed."<sup>13</sup> A remark such as this one is indicative of the inspiration under which the suicide bombers were operating. It was a motivation manifest from the interpretation of their faith as preached to them by Top, Jaelani, and other JI members—a case-in-point itself for the volatility and true danger of Islamo-fascism.

Assisting with the operational planning of the 2009 attacks were Amir Ibrahim—alias Amir Abdullah—and Saifudin Jaelani's older brother, Mohamed Syahrir. While Abdullah's role seemed merely peripheral and logistical, reserving the room at the Marriott from July 15 to 17, Syahrir's role was crucial, as he constructed the bombs that would be used by the suicide jihadists.<sup>14</sup> Discovering Syahrir's contribution to the operation provided real insight into the reach and capabilities of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. It was an important finding because it

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<sup>12</sup> Jerard, Jolene and Fatima Astuti, Mohamed Feisal. *Bombing of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta*. International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Fall 2009. p.10  
[www.pvtr.org/.../BombingOfTheJWMarriott&RitzCarltonJakartaReport.pdf](http://www.pvtr.org/.../BombingOfTheJWMarriott&RitzCarltonJakartaReport.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Australian Free Press. *Noordin Laptop Videos Show Bomb Planning*. World Australia News. 09-30-2009.  
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1101502/Noordin-laptop-videos-show-bomb-planning>

<sup>14</sup> Australian Free Press. *Jakarta Attackers in Turmoil*. World News Australia. 10-13-2009.  
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1110241/Jakarta-attackers-in-turmoil>

reflected the professional and advanced bomb-making knowledge of the group's members, the access the group had to bomb-making resources, and further knowledge on the internal networks and links amongst departments or sub-sections within JI.<sup>15</sup>

Until the creation of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, JI had taken the vanguard position within the armed portion of the extremist movement.<sup>16</sup> To truly understand, then, the distinctiveness of Top's even more violent off-shoot, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, within the context of both Indonesia and the greater Islamic faith, a series of statistics may prove helpful.<sup>17</sup> Of the 240,271,522 registered inhabitants in Indonesia, 86.1 percent are Muslim, or 206,873,780.<sup>18</sup> The U.S. State Department estimates the total operational membership of JI within Indonesia varies from the hundreds to one-thousand.<sup>19</sup> Generously assuming that 1,000 operational members within JI do exist today in Indonesia, it would mean that only .000483 percent of the population who are Muslims align themselves strongly enough with the Salafi beliefs of JI that they felt compelled to join and remain active.<sup>20</sup>

The active membership within Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, however, is far less than 1,000. In fact, it is far less than several hundred. While no exact numbers have been ascertained—given much of the leadership has been killed during police raids and participants beyond that were suicide bombers—all research indicates the Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad cell is approximately a

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<sup>15</sup> International Crisis Group. *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Network*. Crisis Group Asia Report #114. 05-05-2006. p.3.

<sup>16</sup> Jerard, Jolene and Fatima Astuti, Mohamed Feisal. *Bombing of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta*. International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Fall 2009. p.34

<sup>17</sup> Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad has been acknowledged as the most violent wing of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah: Meyer, Joshua and John M. Glionna. *Indonesia hotel attacks may signal return of Jemaah Islamiyah*. 07-18-2009. <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/world/fg-indonesia-bombs18>

<sup>18</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: Indonesia: People: Religions*. ISSN 1553-8133. 02-22-2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>

<sup>19</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Backgrounders. 06-19-2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8948/#p1>

<sup>20</sup> Singaporean officials have estimated total JI membership, within the entire Malaysian archipelago, to be approximately 5,000. Global Security. *Jemaah Islamiya (JI)*. Military: World: Para-military Groups. 04-27-2005.

couple dozen people at most.<sup>21</sup> Translating 24 people into a percentage within a population of more than 240 million is hardly worth citing—.0000116 percent—but it does help to accentuate the extremity of this group within the realm of Islamic terrorism.

Juxtaposing these numbers with a global Muslim population of 1.2 billion people helps frame three important aspects of the reality at hand.<sup>22</sup> First, the size of radical Islamist organizations in this region of the world is truly miniscule. Secondly, without far-reaching, rigorous and sustained efforts of preaching and persuasion, the methodology of suicide jihad and repeated attacks on the local population are forces that ultimately drive membership numbers within Islamo-fascist organizations into the red, cultivating an inherent self-destruction. As noted by the South East Asian think tank The International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, the critical factor in sustaining JI and its many splinter organizations is the unchallenged ideology that fuels the extremist movement; it rests on a wide, interlocking network of schools, publications, charities and other groups that, while in most cases not violent, serve as the recruiting ground for JI and help provide a wider and deeper support and sympathy network for the extremists.<sup>23</sup> Thirdly, and most important, is an echoing truth about the nature of this threat. Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad is an apt illustration of just how dangerous even a handful of people can be in today's world should they desire to do great harm.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibrohim was killed during a police raid on 7 August 2009; Ibrahim on 8 August; Top on 17 September; and Jaelani and Syahrir on 9 October.

<sup>22</sup> The total number of Muslims in the world is derived from an estimate produced by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). <http://www.cair.org>.

<sup>23</sup> Jerard, Jolene and Fatima Astuti, Mohamed Feisal. *Bombing of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta*. International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Fall 2009. p.34

## STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Planning for the July 2009 bombing of the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton began in late April according to a police investigation that followed the attack. Videos from a computer seized during a Central Java raid in September 2009 showed both Top and his associates making detailed preparations for the 17 July attacks as well as the two suicide bombers surveying the perimeters and façades of both hotels.<sup>24</sup> All evidence indicates these attacks were premeditated at length and involved an intricate review of the hotels' blue prints, reservation and event logs, and daily traffic patterns—vehicular and pedestrian.

By checking in to the JW Marriott under a false name on 15 July, two days prior to the attack, suicide bomber Dani Dwi Pratama and his colleague, Nana Ikhwan Maulana, were able to make final observations and preparations for the placement of the bombs. The five bombs were smuggled into the Ritz Carlton on 16 July through the hotel's employee entrance and loading dock area using a vehicle rented by Ibrohim—the florist who worked in a gift shop in the tunnel that joined the two hotels, thus providing him access to the restricted area.<sup>25</sup> One of the bombs would remain on a timer in the suite in which the bombers were staying—room 1808, which had been reserved under a false name by Amir Ibrahim “Abdullah”—and Pratama and Maulana would each carry in their bags the remaining two bombs, each weighing approximately 4.5-5kg.<sup>26</sup>

As an immediate review of hotel security logs indicated, both hotels were operating at “threat condition red” and security measures similar to those used in airports were in place and

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<sup>24</sup> Australian Free Press. *Noordin Laptop Videos Show Bomb Planning*. World Australia News. 09-30-2009. <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1101502/Noordin-laptop-videos-show-bomb-planning>

<sup>25</sup> Jerard, Jolene and Fatima Astuti, Mohamed Feisal. *Bombing of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta*. International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Fall 2009. p.10

<sup>26</sup> Graphic illustrations of the remaining body parts from both bombers that were found and pieced together for an autopsy indicate where on their persons each man carried his bag. See Appendix Photos.

functioning.<sup>27</sup> Under these protocols, and since the previous 2003 bombings at the JW Marriott, all enhanced security measures put in place were operational on 17 July: All driveways sealed off, increasing the setback from the lobby entrance; a blast wall with a capacity to withstand approximately 10-tons of Trinitrotoluene (TNT); barricades at entrance and exits points; a vehicle checkpoint; metal detectors; explosive vapor detectors used for luggage; patrolling security officers with canine units; digital CCTV cameras; and laminated glass that stretched to the third floor.<sup>28</sup> After meticulous planning and forward area reconnaissance, Dani Dwi Pratama and Nana Ikhwan Maulana surely knew of these mechanisms and thus approached their infiltration and placement of the bombs accordingly.

On the morning of 17 July, each hotel's CCTV shows both men walking through the lobbies toward the main breakfast restaurants. A great fault in the tactics of the attacks, however, was a lack of synchronized timing between the explosions. The JW Marriott bomb exploded at 7:47am while the Ritz-Carlton bomber did not detonate his bomb until 7:57am. This had given those in the Ritz-Carlton time to move outside or toward windows to see the smoke and fire at the Marriott and away from where Nana Ikhwan Maulana had placed his bag with the bomb in it. The fifth bomb that was left on a timer in room 1808 malfunctioned and did not detonate. In studying the explosive composition and design work of the unexploded bomb, police noted it was similar to those found in a cache in 2004 in Cicurug, West Java, those used in both the 2005 Malang operation where Dr. Azahari was killed and the second Bali bombings, the bombs employed in the 2008 Palembang group, those used in the 2009 Cilacap Operation carried

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<sup>27</sup> Australian Free Press. *Marriott Jakarta Had 'Tight Security'*. The Age. 07-18-2009.

<http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/marriott-jakarta-had-tight-security-20090718-doph.html>

<sup>28</sup> Jerard, Jolene and Fatima Astuti, Mohamed Feisal. *Bombing of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta*. International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Fall 2009. p.15

out on 14 July 2009, and identical to the makeup of all previous bombs in JI attacks.<sup>29</sup>

The 17 July attacks were clearly consistent with the tradecraft employed during previous operations and again reflected a long-term strategy begun with Jemaah Islamiyah: The targeting of Western icons, notably at a time when and place where Westerners would be numerous—breakfast cafés in luxury hotels; the use of multiple explosions during coordinated attacks; a propensity for large secondary explosions—seen here not as a car bomb but instead a remote room bomb; and a preference for suicide bombings. As noted, these tactics are literal excerpts from the al-Qa'ida training manual and denote coherent patterns of planning and execution.

#### **USE OF PROPAGANDA, OUTSIDE SUPPORT, AND THE INDONESIAN COUNTER-RESPONSE**

While Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad has never focused its time or resources on using the Indonesian press to promulgate the successes of its attacks, it has continued to inspire others to berjihad through radical teaching, vociferous preaching, and religious beseeching.

Whomever or whatever exactly was underwriting these operations was a secret that went to the grave with a bullet-riddled Noordin Top. However, recruiting, training, indoctrination, financial and operational links between the JI and other militant groups, such as al-Qa'ida, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Philippines, the Misuari Renegade/Breakaway Group (MRG/MBG) and the Filipino Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM), have existed for many years and continue to this day.<sup>30</sup> As arrests surrounding the 17 July attacks continue to be made by Indonesian police, more light may be shed on those directly responsible for the financing of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. What is known to date is that Hambali,

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<sup>29</sup> Moestafa, Berni and Bambang Djanuarto. *Jakarta Hotel Bombers Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, Police Say*. Bloomberg News. 07-19-2009. <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aslTMQui6g4U>.

<sup>30</sup> Abuza, Zachary. *Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah*. The National Bureau of Asian Research. 12-01-2003. <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol14no5.pdf>

a JI hierarch who was arrested in Thailand in August of 2003 for masterminding the 2003 Marriott bombings, had formed a front company called Konsojaya to help launder money to such plots throughout the mid 1990s and early 2000s.<sup>31</sup> With Hambali's intimate connections to so many JI members—including Noordin Top—there is a real possibility that access to some monies from Konsojaya remained accessible to Top and others. Additionally, Hambali had already set a precedent for a secret team pursuing berjihad on its own; this was possible because he controlled a separate line of funding from al-Qa'ida itself.<sup>32</sup> A book that appears based in part on the transcripts of Hambali's interrogation says Hambali arranged for A\$25,000 to be sent for the 2003 Marriott operation: A\$15,000 for operational expenses, and A\$10,000 for Bali bomber families; and Hambali's younger brother, Rusman Gunawan, who was arrested in Karachi in September 2003, testified that Hambali often secured large sums of money from al-Qa'ida.<sup>33</sup> Access to AQ funding was surely assumed by another JI member following Hambali's arrest, but whether that funding remained throughout the peak of the Global War on Terrorism is uncertain.

What made it difficult for Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad to attain funds over the last few years was the same thing that ultimately led to its collapse in the fall of 2009: Indonesian counterterrorism authorities. With an annual budget over \$492,297,799.83 and over 5,689 personnel, the Badan Intelijen Negara—Indonesia's State Intelligence Agency—was well poised to assist regional police units in locating and arresting myriad JI and splinter cell members since attacks began in 2002.<sup>34</sup> The anti-terrorism campaign was so successful, that by March of 2009

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<sup>31</sup> Knowledgerush. *Jemaah Islamiyah: History*. [http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Jemaah\\_Islamiyah/](http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Jemaah_Islamiyah/)

<sup>32</sup> Conboy, Ken. *INTEL: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*. Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte. Ltd. Jakarta. 2004. p.229

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Hippner, Christian. *A Study Into the Size of the World's Intelligence Industry*. Department of Intelligence Studies. Mercyhurst College. Erie, PA. October 2009. p.96

Indonesian authorities had arrested 436 terrorism suspects since the 2002 Bali bombings.<sup>35</sup> Of that figure, 360 of the suspects were either being prosecuted or had been convicted, including three Bali bombers—Amrozi, Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, who have been executed—and two others—Iwan Darmawan Mutho and Achmad Hasan—who were convicted over the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and are now on death row.<sup>36</sup>

It was those who remained beyond the reach of Indonesian law enforcement and intelligence authorities that were responsible for the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Bombings in 2009; namely, the leadership of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. It was not long after these attacks, however, before authorities had hunted down and terminated the parties involved. On 7 August 2009 Ibrahim, the florist, was killed during a police raid; and the following day, Amir Ibrahim “Abdullah” was gunned down by counterterrorism authorities during a raid on his hideout. Noordin Mohammed Top himself narrowly escaped death on the Friday night of 7 August 2009 during a 17-hour standoff at a farm house amid rice fields in Central Java. Believing Top was inside, anti-terror police unleashed a indiscriminate, war-like litany of gunfire and explosive charges to ensure South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist would finally be retired. After firing from a distance through the walls of the house for hours on end and detonating numerous explosive charges that destroyed portions of the building, authorities confirmed that Top was, in fact, not in the residence.<sup>37</sup>

By 17 September, however, Top’s luck had run out, and he was killed in a hail of exchanged gunfire with Indonesian police. The remaining known leadership of Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad—Saifudin Jaelani and his older brother Mohamed Syahrir—were killed not long after,

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<sup>35</sup> Australian Associated Press. *436 Terror Arrests in Indonesia Since 2002: Report*. The Australian.03-03-2009. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/terror-arrests-since-2002/story-e6frg6t6-111119018829>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> To view the police raid on Top’s farmhouse, see: <http://www.mizo.com/world/08/2009/08/asia-s-most-wanted-man-killed.html>

during a raid on 9 October 2009. At the time of this writing, authorities believe the splinter cell known as Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad has been completely disrupted, with no one yet moving to fill the void in leadership left by Top, Jaelani and Syahrir.

While efforts to dismantle the greater JI network in Indonesia and Malaysia remain vigorous, the recent 17 July attacks articulate two points very clearly: more work is needed to ensure the resuscitation of JI and splinter groups does not occur, and anything less than a 100 percent success rate at stopping terrorism is a failure rate. Nonetheless, every attack offers the opportunity to acquire more knowledge on the present threat and a better understanding about how to prevent the next strike. The JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings are no exception.

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

Since the international community launched its collective assault on terrorism, the most successful nation in the world at combating Islamo-fascism has been Indonesia. With over 400 arrests and the killing of dozens of JI members and splinter cell leadership, Indonesian anti-terrorism authorities have learned much about how to counter the radicalization process and how to best prosecute the terrorists in detention.

Unlike the U.S. and her closest allies, all of Indonesia's counterterrorism arrests have resulted in transparent legal proceedings with a very high conviction rate.<sup>38</sup> This has allowed for swift, unquestionable, uncontroversial results, unlike with the United States' process. It has also ensured that terrorist recruitment efforts have not been afforded more fodder. As a result of Indonesia's aggressive campaign to arrest and prosecute network members, JI has been fundamentally compromised and disrupted on the islands.

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<sup>38</sup> Sheridan, Greg. *Jakarta's Terrorist Rehab*. The Australian. 05-31-2008.  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/jakartas-terrorist-rehab/story-e6frg6v6-111116492467>

The second major lesson learned early by Indonesian officials was that the hard power of counter-terrorism efforts must also be commensurate with the employment of intelligent soft power. To strike this balance, a program of deradicalization has been a core, and constantly refined, tenet of the CT campaign with each additional arrest. Indonesian authorities did not want the immediate and extended families of arrested terrorists to form a permanently alienated and bitter subculture that hated the state, so they made sure the families of detainees were able to continue to send their children to school, had adequate housing, job training, and access to literature written by former radical Muslims.<sup>39</sup> Such people and their books have proven extremely beneficial given most radicals have been inculcated to trust only fellow network members.

As a result of these lessons learned, and the success they have catalyzed over the last decade, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad has been dismantled, al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah has been run deep underground and JI's international connections have been greatly reduced.<sup>40</sup> It is evident that Indonesia has learned the necessity of a whole government approach to counterterrorism as well as the need for close and cooperative efforts and intelligence sharing with Malaysian and Filipino authorities—neighbors who, too, possess a strong interest in regional security. To complement every effort and lesson aforesaid, improvements in the social and political conditions in the country have also made it far harder for terrorist recruitment to occur.<sup>41</sup> Every nation facing a threat from radical Islamists should be taking notes on the Indonesian approach. By applying the same lessons learned, they may be able to prevent their own JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings.

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<sup>39</sup> Sheridan, Greg. *Jakarta's Terrorist Rehab*. The Australian. 05-31-2008.

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/jakartas-terrorist-rehab/story-e6frg6v6-1111116492467>

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Padden, Brian. *Indonesia Uses 'Soft Approach' to Contain Terrorist Threat*. Voice of America News. 01-18-2010.  
<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Indonesia-Uses-Soft-Approach-to-Contain-Terrorist-Threat-81960552.html>

## Appendices

To see the police raid on Top's farmhouse, see:

<http://www.mizo.com/world/08/2009/08/asia-s-most-wanted-man-killed.html>

Ensuing addendums are compliments of The International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

**JW MARRIOTT  
HOTEL**

**REGISTRATION CARD**

Check-in Date: 15-07-09  
Check-out Date: 17-07-09

Room No.	Room Type	Room Rate	Tax	Confirmation No.	Guest No.	Room Number
J 12	TRT	140.000	1.000	2476122		430002019

Address: **Yonler Duing Waboyan Lawa**  
**Area: Jember @ jember.com**

Phone: **031-8333333**  
 Fax: **031-8333333**

Country: **INDONESIA**  
 City: **JEMBER**  
 State: **JAWA TIMUR**


Payment Method: **Prepaid**

Guest Name: **Tanda Targua Targua**


Signature: *[Handwritten Signature]*

Remarks: *[Handwritten Note]*

The registration card signed under a false name during check-in on 15 July 2009.



CCTV footage shows terrorist suspects unloading bombs and equipment at the employee loading dock at the Ritz-Carlton.



CCTV footage shows suicide bomber Nana Ikhwan Maulana carrying his bag with bombs into the Ritz-Carlton breakfast restaurant.



CCTV footage displays terrorist suspects smuggling in bombing equipment through employee entrance at Ritz-Carlton.



Autopsy photos indicate the bag with bombs was carried at waist level by bomber Dani Dwi Pratama, as portions of his midsection were obliterated during the explosion and unable to be found.

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