Current Events        vs.       Founding Documents

Entry 83

Current Event

According to the Wall Street Journal; March 22, 2011 (full article available on-line)

WASHINGTON- President Barack Obama Monday formally notified Congress the U.S. had begun military attacks on Libya, prompting complaints from lawmakers that the president waged war without congressional consent, appearing to contradict his own previous position.

Lawmakers continue to raise questions about the legality and purpose of the U.S. participation in Libyan air strikes and patrolling of the No-Fly Zone. WSJ’s Siobhan Hughes has details.

In a letter to congressional leaders, the president said the U.S. had “commenced operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council” and “to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya.”

Presidents over the decades have conducted military operations without prior congressional approval, including Harry Truman in Korea, George H.W. Bush in Iraq and and President Bill Clinton in Serbia. Congress in 1991 approved the Iraq military action, five months after Mr. Bush deployed forces to the region in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The military action in Libya, which Congress wasn’t asked to approve, irked lawmakers.

Sen. Jim Webb, (D., Va.,) said in an interview Monday with MSNBC, “We have not had a debate and I know that there was some justification put into place because of concern for civilian casualties, but this isn’t the way that our system is supposed to work.”

House Democrats held a conference call over the weekend to discuss Libya, and support among lawmakers was mixed, a congressional aide said. Frustration appears to be coming from rank-and-file lawmakers left out of Mr. Obama’s Libya briefing to committee chairmen Friday.

In 2007, Mr. Obama, then a presidential candidate, said, “The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”

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Mr. Obama’s notification letter does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that Congress approve military action, says Lou Fisher, former researcher with the Congressional Research Service and an expert on war powers. Mr. Fisher also raised objections to Mr. Obama citing United Nations authorization in his letter.

“It’s impossible for Congress to take its war powers and give it to the U.N.,” Mr. Fisher said. “Other than defensive actions—and there’s no defensive actions here—this has to be done by Congress.”

The president, with his letter, appeared to meet the requirements of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which says only that in cases where the president doesn’t seek prior approval from lawmakers, the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and puts a 60 day deadline on such actions.

House Speaker John Boehner doesn’t believe the president always needs congressional approval to go take military action, a spokesman for the Ohio Republican said. However, “members of Congress from both parties, as well as the American people, are demanding the administration do a better job answering some basic questions about the scope and purpose of our mission in Libya, America’s role, and how it will be achieved,” said the spokesman, Brendan Buck.

…

A number of Democratic and Republican lawmakers are concerned about the White House’s air assault on Libya, but Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) raised the rhetoric to 11 on Monday, suggesting President Obama should be impeached.

“President Obama moved forward without Congress approving. He didn’t have Congressional authorization, he has gone against the Constitution, and that’s got to be said,” Kucinich said in an interview with Raw Story.

“It’s not even disputable, this isn’t even a close question. Such an action — that involves putting America’s service men and women into harm’s way, whether they’re in the Air Force or the Navy — is a grave decision that cannot be made by the president alone.”

According to Kucinich, Obama’s decision “would appear on its face to be an impeachable offense,” though he questioned whether Congress would ever move forward with a trial in practice.

As reported earlier by Politico, Kucinich raised the specter of impeachment in a conference call with Democratic lawmakers on Saturday.

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According to the Wall Street Journal: Nov 29, 2007 (full article available on-line)

Democratic presidential candidates have steered clear of impeachment talk on the stump, but Sen. Joe Biden unequivocally told a New Hampshire crowd today that he will move for impeachment if the Bush administration bombs Iran without congressional authority.

“The President has no authority to unilaterally attack Iran and if he does, as Foreign Relations Committee chairman, I will move to impeach,” Biden told a crowd of 60 at a Seacoast Media Forum. The site also reported that Biden said he is currently preparing a legal memorandum on his impeachment threat.

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Presidents vs. The Constitution

Founding Document

The Constitution: Article 1 – Section 8 (excerpts)-

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

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To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

We the People:

Attacking another country with military force is an act of war.   Only the Congress holds this power and it must give prior approval.  Who remembers the intentions to “temporarily” participate in the Vietnam War and the word “police action”?

Even Republican Speaker Boehner is not inclined to exercise this check on executive powers.  Why?  It is because we tolerate it.  The founders wisely gave this authority only to the peoples’ branch of government because it was “the people” whose lives were placed in harm’s way by such decisions.  And the founders expected the votes of the elected officials to be counted and recorded.

Every time we allow our leaders to exceed their Constitutional authority, or when we tolerate inaction to enforce it, a reduced reference is established for the future; and so goes the diminished progression of our liberty.

More impactful to the current situation in Libya is that of these fighters, 3.4% come from Misratah (aka Misrata), 23.9% from Benghazi and 60.2% from Darnah, all being current strongholds in the anti-Gadhafi rebellion.

As reported, Gadhafi himself has recognized the dangers of the city of Darnah as being a hotbed for Al-Qaida and has tried to convince the world AQ is the reason for the uprisings against him.  The international community has rightly disregarded his assertion.  However, the facts derived from the Sinjar reports and West Point’s analysis are important to keep in mind as U.S., NATO and UN military operations continue and possibly grow in scope.

Dissimilar to the Egyptian rebellion, where Al-Qaida was absent in the movement and had little to no foothold in the country, the United States and NATO allies must be cautious in the progression of their involvement in Libya with a known radical foothold.   With Gadhafi vowing a long, drawn out fight to the death, there will be significant differences in the ideology of the people fighting, and the longer fighting continues, the higher the possibility that AQ and other extremists with resources and weapons will gain influence when Gadhafi is out of power.

As the debate unfolds on whether or not to arm a large Islamic faction, about whom we know very little, the United State and her allies would do well to recall the lessons learned from arming rebels in a 1980’s Afghanistan.  Nothing is more important than foresight during operations like these.

This commentary and analysis was written by Michael Hopfersperger, Global Security Intern at PAI, and Drew Davis, Executive Director, PAI.  Reach the authors at global.security.intern@paxamericanainstitute.org and execdirector@paxamericanainstitute.org.

This special report identifies 55 clear violations of international law by the Islamic Republic of Iran:

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Nuclear Program/Proliferation Violations: 18

8 IAEA Resolutions,

6 UNSC Resolutions,

4 Treaties/Agreements;

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Crimes Against Humanity: 30

21 UNSC Resolutions,

3 Treaties,

6 G.A. Resolutions;

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Human Rights: 7

7 All Treaties/Agreements;

Each of the below cited conventions, treaties, resolutions, statutes, and agreements was examined individually, assuring reviewers that the sources and information are accurate and were not derived from corrupt or inaccurate online, print or television reports.  It should be noted this report does not evidence every violation of the cited conventions, treaties, resolutions, statutes, and agreements between 1948 and 2011, as entire books have been written on the collusion between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its terrorist proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. This report is intended to provide reviewers with a comprehensive framework with which to judge the actions and declarations of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Download SPECIAL REPORT: Iran’s Violations of International Law 03-2011

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Executive Summary

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the relationship between the United States and Iran has transformed from staunch allies to intractable opponents.  Today, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, support of terrorism and blatant violations of human rights constitute some of the most complex and pressing challenges facing the United States.  This problem is exacerbated by growing pessimism about whether the international community’s diplomatic efforts can compel Iran to comply with its obligations under international law.

This report draws on diverse branches of substantive international law and shows that Iran is in violation of over 50 international laws.  While diplomacy has failed to gain traction, Iran continues to blatantly violate the rights of its citizens, support international terrorism, and advance its nuclear program to the point where it is now well within striking distance of having a nuclear weapon.  Clearly, Iran’s violations of international law pose a grave and pressing threat to the United States and the international community as a whole.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

As a non-nuclear state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran owes a legal duty to the international community to refrain from manufacturing and acquiring nuclear weapons.  These obligations are interpreted by the NPT’s enforcement agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to also require states to provide credible assurance regarding non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Iran’s systematic violations of the NPT are well documented.  Despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Iran’s nuclear work is not consistent with any other application than the development of a nuclear weapon.  Iran continues to conceal its nuclear program and conduct enrichment-related activities, in violation of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, all subsequent IAEA Safeguards Resolutions, and numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Crimes Against Humanity

Iran’s incitements to commit genocide are not only preludes to tragedy, but are crimes in themselves under international law.  Pursuant to the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute of the ICC, Iran has a legal duty to refrain from the threat of genocide or force against members of a group or the political integrity of any other state.  Iran’s public call for Israel to “wiped off the map” is a state-sanctioned call to genocide that threatens the territorial integrity of Israel and contravenes its obligations under international law.

Iran has also violated numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the state-sponsorship of terrorism.  At least thirteen Resolutions have reaffirmed the obligation of Member States to deny all forms of support to terrorists and those supporting terrorism.  As this report will detail, there is compelling evidence that Iran provides training, financial support, and arms shipments to terrorist organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  This is in clear violation of the Security Council resolutions and poses a serious threat to international security.

Human Rights

As a party to several human rights treaties and as a Member State of the United Nations, Iran is legally obligated to protect the civil, political and religious rights of its citizens.  Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been involved in large-scale abuses of human rights, including systematic persecution of religious minorities and severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression and assembly.  This report will detail the failure of Iran to comply with numerous international covenants to which it is a signatory.

Iran in Iraq

Iran’s Qods Force, a wing of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, provides funding, training, weapons and other lethal support to Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition and Iraqi forces.  Despite President Ahmadinejad’s pledge to cut off such support, the United States Department of Defense continues to assert that there has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal militias in Iraq.

Iran’s support of Iraqi militant groups is contrary to six United Nations General Assembly Declarations and thirteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions which prohibit all Member States from using force against the political independence of any other state and impose the duty upon all Member States to refrain from supporting terrorist activities.  Iran’s failure to comply with these obligations remains a significant impediment to stabilizing Iraq.

-The Policy Division of The Pax Americana Institute

The immediate crisis in Egypt is not yet over.  Over the last few days, it had become clear that even though Mubarak remained the titular head of the Egyptian government and that no other individual had technically achieved a higher degree of authority than he, leadership had not transferred but stagnated.  No one in the high levels of the government appears to have been making any firm decisions—waiting, perhaps, to see who would blink first.

For a short time, Mubarak had attempted to mollify the crowds by officially naming his chief aide and long-time intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as Vice President, but this appeased no one.  Yesterday, the Egyptian ambassador to the United States asserted that Suleiman had indeed assumed full presidential powers under the country’s constitution.  But as late as this morning, the military officially stated its intent to execute Mubarak’s orders and implement his decisions.  It was almost out of nowhere that the news broke that Mubarak had fled Cairo.  Suleiman, looking very shaky and pale-faced, finally made the briefest possible official announcement to the world today that Mubarak had indeed fled and that power had been transferred to the Armed Forces Supreme Council.

This new status quo of military committee leadership is almost certainly at least somewhat more permanent than the embarrassing spectacle of non-leadership that has occurred in the last two weeks.  But it is not at all clear what will happen next, when it will occur, or how drastic the changes might be.  The Egyptian military, so far, has been notable mostly for its non-participation; at the most, it enabled a permissive atmosphere for the civilian protests to continue.

The Egyptian military is certain to play a greater role than it has so far.  What that role will be is practically impossible to guess.  The military does have a substantial stake in preserving the overall status quo at this stage for more than one reason.  For example, the generals now have control that the military has not held for generations, and they are not likely to relinquish it to just anyone.  Additionally, the Egyptian military, like many other world armies, is directly and heavily invested in the national economy—which has all but shut down in the last few weeks.

The single thing uniting the diverse protesters so far has been their hatred of the personage of Mubarak.  Their only objective has been accomplished.  If the protesters return, whether tomorrow or in the more distant future, to demand fundamental political change instead of a mere handover from one dictator to another, the military will have a tough decision split along roughly three lines: (1) Actively and purposely foster the emergence of free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law, and all the other elements of a free society—eventually transferring its power to a civilian government; (2) Deny the protesters any further gains and exert its newfound authority, possibly by force; or (3) Attempt some hybrid of these two extremes in which some change is permitted but some power is not surrendered.

There is little to suggest which of these courses the newly-empowered army might choose.  It is not even necessarily the case that the protesters will make such demands or do so in nearly the popular strength with which they demanded the initial ousting of the person of Mubarak.  But if they do, turmoil could break out again soon.

Egypt has not yet experienced a true revolution.  It is inspiring that even in the heart of the Arab world, it is still possible today for a civilian population to unite to overthrow from within a tyrannical regime with relatively limited bloodshed.  But, as suggested above, this has been far from a systematic transformation.

Consider briefly the context of the American Revolution.  The founding fathers began by insisting that the English king recognize their natural rights and their political rights.  When he refused, their physical resistance grew, but they extended the Olive Branch Petition to the king as a further entreaty to make fundamental, necessary changes within the British government.  When that failed, they appealed to their natural rights and to the Author of nature’s laws to judge their consciences.  They fought for good ideas and against evil ideas, and the new government they eventually formed genuinely transformed the political foundation of American society—for the better, as it was built on natural law in a way no other nation achieved before or since.

Consider also the context of the French Revolution, the height of which occurred only a few years later.  This revolution was also founded on philosophical ideals, but the excesses that these particular ideas inspired partly demonstrated that those ideas were not as pure as the American foundation.  For example, the ideas behind the “Age of Reason” led to the total rejection of religious institutions that held society and communities together and helped articulate natural and moral limitations on the people’s right to overthrow states.  Still, the French nation not only ousted and replaced a leader but also actually tore down and rebuilt the institutions of leadership and political society.

The events in Egypt to date have come nowhere near such a threshold of transformation, comparisons to the fall of the Berlin Wall to the contrary.  There has been no common (or even relatively common) ideological thread holding the movement together whatsoever.  Even though the Muslim Brotherhood is still an active force in Egypt and is undoubtedly looking to gain from the turmoil, the movement so far has been secular.  Neither is there any kind of liberal democratic element present.

The people of Egypt have been protesting because they are poor and because their leader consistently failed to help them become any less poor, despite his promises and his iron-fisted attempts to control the economy.  Mubarak was an obstacle to economic freedom.  So is any such rigid command economy.  But the protesters do not seem—yet—to have demanded political transformation that will foster economic transformation and empower their society.  Though their courage has been remarkable, they have only demanded and achieved the removal of one particular obstacle.  Even if they do proceed to demand more, the grip of the military leadership must relax what has been a terrific stranglehold on economic liberalization in Egypt in the last several decades in order for the society to begin making a true transformation in terms of both economic progress and political progress.

It is far too early to know whether the waves of popular uprising will spread.  The mainstream media’s experts are excitedly and freely speculating that the Egyptian movement is providing renewed inspiration for democratic movements throughout the Middle East.  There is virtually no evidence that this is true.  Nor does this first, semi-positive step in Egypt indicate that other uprisings in other states would enjoy similar outcomes.

Egypt was a unique situation, and it is highly dangerous to try to extend the lessons of this most recent, still-evolving context to other regions.  In particular, the Egyptian people’s objectives have been extremely limited in demanding the ouster of a particular person rather than a complete, systematic societal and political revolution.  Most importantly, however, the Egyptian leadership refused to order the military to employ force to limit the protests, and the military itself refused to answer any temptation to do so on its own.

The problems in other key Middle Eastern states are deeper and their governments generally more inclined to prevent popular insurrection via armed force.  In Iran, for example (perhaps the most widely-cited among the talking heads today), the Revolution began by force, has ruled by force and attempted to spread violence throughout the region at almost every turn, and as recently as last year has forcibly stamped out sparks of major internal dissent.  Further, even if the people of Iran were to compel a particular set of leaders to surrender their power, it is going to require an experience more like the American Revolution and less like this Egyptian insurrection to reverse problems like WMD development and support for international terrorism.  The seeds of evil are sown deeply in Iran and will not be easily uprooted.  The same is true in places like Gaza and Lebanon, and even on other continents (as in North Korea): even if the people could theoretically seize authority from their oppressors, any successful internal uprising will face severe difficulty establishing a cornerstone of liberty.

Also, it should not be forgotten that the fall of Mubarak may yet result in a net loss of U.S. power and global influence.  Mubarak was an important ally in the Global War on Terror.  He has received billions of dollars in American military aid over many years, and the United States has invested heavily in making the Egyptian military a modern, powerful, allied force.  Additionally, his willingness to enforce Anwar Sadat’s earlier peace deal with Israel contributed importantly to the entire region’s security.  If a new government takes power that is hostile or even lukewarm to maintaining a healthy relationship with the United States, America has much to lose.  The same can be said of many other important U.S. allies with governments no less dictatorial than Egypt’s, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Leadership in the American intelligence services needs improvement.  CIA Director Leon Panetta acted strangely in the last 48 hours and has aggravated a situation of American impotence as the crisis developed.

Thursday morning, the day before Mubarak actually did resign, Panetta testified before the House Select Intelligence Committee that Mubarak’s resignation on Thursday was a “strong likelihood.”  He also said that the CIA had no definitive evidence as to whether power would be transferred to Suleiman or to the Egyptian military.  Separately, a CIA spokesman stated that Panetta’s prediction was based not on any definitive intelligence developed in secret but on popular news accounts.

To be clear, none of this was technically wrong or improper.  American intelligence frequently gleans useful information, especially when it is developing rapidly, from open sources.  On Thursday morning, it did indeed appear likely that Mubarak could resign that day.

But the Obama administration had an embarrassing problem on Thursday evening when Mubarak had not resigned, despite the CIA director’s prediction, and it had an even more embarrassing problem when, on Friday morning, the Egyptian military seemed to have thrown its support publicly behind Mubarak—by all indications reinforcing, rather than replacing, his authority.

Considering the obvious fact that it took until Friday afternoon for the Egyptian power players to decide where their loyalties lay and what each of them intended to do, it is deeply puzzling that Panetta felt so confident on Thursday morning that Mubarak’s demise was imminent at any moment.

Panetta’s erroneous prediction and the spokesman’s admission combined to make CIA look rather amateurish at a time when the United States ought to be leading.  This incident has cast some doubt about the quality of advice being presented to the president in this and other intelligence matters.  What other brash predictions from the CIA chief have resulted in poor policy?

This incident indicates weakness in the Obama administration’s foreign policy strategy.  Despite Vice President Joe Biden’s claim today that the United States had spoken “with one voice” about the Egyptian crisis in the past few weeks, the Obama administration has fumbled this one.

Beyond the intelligence gaffe just described, American policy has failed in other ways.  When this crisis began, the Obama administration tepidly and vaguely supported progress in the development of democratic reforms in Egypt.  It was not until the crisis had grown much larger that the administration joined the protesters in calling for Mubarak’s resignation.  Like Egypt’s own divided leaders, the Obama team generally sat on the sidelines until this outcome became inevitable.

What is striking here is that there seems to have been little sense of vision in the president’s responses as the crisis developed.  Except for reciting its standard rhetoric about the “unacceptability of violence” and the general promotion of “universal values” and “core principles,” the administration has not exactly gone out of its way to articulate what an ideal end-state should look like.  If the protesters are to be faulted somewhat for failing to galvanize around any sort of philosophy, then the American leadership should be faulted ever more severely for failing to say more than that these changes are part of a “path toward democracy.”  Meanwhile, other Middle Eastern heads of state are fearful, no doubt, that the Americans will abandon them at the first sight of trouble in the future.  Why should they stick out their necks to fight terrorism, implement human rights reform, and the like if the Obama administration has no intention of backing them up?

American leaders have to walk a tightrope between traditionally realist necessities of international security and the liberal ideals of guarding human rights and spreading democracy.  But the Bush Doctrine of the early 2000s balanced these in both a logical and moral way.  Wars were fought and regimes overthrown out of real security interests.  Nations were rebuilt and values shared out of moral obligation.  Some wars—like those in Liberia and the Sudan— were not fought because they were not calculated to be necessary.  Most importantly, there was a clear method for making this sort of decision.  Action was taken in specific ways in specific places in order to pursue a particular vision.

It is not clear that the Obama Doctrine has much more to it than to generally “promote” improvement everywhere.  Troops were withdrawn from Iraq not because their work was done yet but because the president promised that they would leave in advance of an arbitrary deadline.  The American presence in Afghanistan is being handled in precisely the same manner.  Other state leaders ought to be worried about how far the Obama administration might support them because, if the accomplishment of American strategy is not determining foreign policy decisions, then the Americans are pursuing nothing more than an ad hoc, Don’t-Rock-the-Boat sort of plan.  As for Egypt, there has been no indication of how far America might go to support either side or to what purpose.  This is another reason to doubt whether the wave of reform might extend to other countries: the United States has given little indication whether it would lend such movements any support or simply wait until the end to see who might win.

American foreign policy strategy should focus on accomplishing four main strategic national security objectives as it did in the early 2000s.  It should aim to preempt imminent security threats to American interests.  It should maneuver to prevent, where possible, likely future security threats that will become more deeply problematic later.  It should aim to preserve American primacy, maintaining hegemony in areas where it exists and expanding capability in areas in which it is threatened.  And it should aim to spread democracy, liberty, and the rule of law to targeted places of the world from which threats to security and prosperity emerge in its absence.  The Obama administration has not framed any of its decisions about the crisis in Egypt in these terms, preferring instead to assert only by implication that Egypt’s “path to democracy” must be an inherently good thing.

Nick Krueger is the Policy Director of the Pax Americana Institute.

Topics discussed by President Obama and President Hu included American national security concerns—especially in Korea and Iran—as well as future Chinese foreign policy objectives, intellectual property disputes, human rights inside China, and bilateral trade.  The Obama team especially sought fuller insight on China’s policies and its leadership’s view of the world as it relates to the United States.  With so much ground to cover in so few days, there is clearly more discussion and high level dialogue that must occur in order for these issues to be resolved, but some progress was nonetheless achieved.

For Midwesterners, the compromises made during the state visit are hopeful signs.  Among the most important of these were discussions on improving the protection of American intellectual property in Asian markets; the finalization of a major American export deal; and senior-level discussions about how China can better foster an American-friendly business climate.  Unfortunately, President Hu’s time in office will end in 2012, and the jury is still out as to how much improvement in these areas will actually occur before then.  It is important that Midwesterners continue to encourage their elected officials to keep pressing China to follow through with these agreements.

It is clear from President Hu’s meeting with Defense Secretary Robert Gates that China’s military continues to be a cause for considerable American concern.  China’s rapid progress toward the development of stealth technology in its air forces (including a recent test flight by a prototype fighter aircraft) and the expansion of its modern, nuclear-powered submarine fleet threaten to erode the margin of American military dominance.  Like many other non-democratic states, China’s military also seems to be affected as much by internal political infighting as by external, geostrategic factors.  Recent growth in Chinese military capability, combined with the potential for instability inherent in Communist-led militaries (especially as a transition of power approaches), is an important trend for American policymakers to consider.

On the issue of human rights, President Hu admitted that “a lot still needs to be done in China, in terms of human rights.”  This admission is the first of its kind from China and represents a large step forward for America’s interest in China’s human rights.  This too, however, is limited in practical value, because across China this admission was omitted from televised presentations of the press conference and omitted from newsprint as well.  Such censorship is a glaring fault against China’s Communist leadership and demonstrates just how far away the Chinese nation remains from tasting true liberty.

Bilateral commerce was yet another topic of discussion.  China has made it increasingly hard for U.S. companies to do business in China—and even to do business here on U.S. soil by flooding the market with cheap goods.  China’s regulatory compliance has made it extremely difficult for U.S. business to thrive in China and to compete with the major state-owned enterprises (or SOEs) in China, which seemingly conspire to demolish competition.  SOEs themselves constitute another large issue, exhibiting tremendous influence over the Chinese government and generally failing to adhere to WTO rules as required.  China must relax its own regulations and must start to abide by WTO requirements consistently.

During his meeting with the U.S.-China Business Council and the National Committee on United States-China Relations, President Hu commented that our nations have never shared more common interests or shouldered more responsibilities together, especially in the Asia region. President Obama suggested a means of pressing China and using this as a point of leverage, stating, “Opening new markets to American products [is] how we’ll create jobs today.”  And do we need it.  The $45 billion trade agreement the Presidents agreed upon will not shrink our trade deficit with China, which stands at an enormous $250 billion.  President Obama and his administration must continue to press Beijing on this issue.

On the last day of his visit, President Hu promised that he is looking forward to closer ties and trust with the United States on a spectrum of global issues.  His promise of cooperation is a good sign that our nations will be able to work together—at least, on some issues, until 2012 when President Hu leaves office.  The state visit was adjourned on the note that there are still major economic differences between the two nations, but there are signs that some of these will continue to be negotiated.  The summit also highlighted a few domestic issues for the American government to focus on in the wake of the meeting.  Finally, this visit highlighted America’s need to be assertive and aggressive in foreign policy.  American “decline” is a choice, not inevitability.  Instead, we must do what Americans have always done:  roll up our sleeves and go to work on these issues, always negotiating from a position of strength and forcing political systems with interests antithetical to American interests to adapt to us, instead of the reverse.

Todd Searle is a PAI Contributing Fellow for East Asian Affairs.

For years, CIA and other military efforts have barraged Pakistan with missile strikes. Many of these efforts have resulted in the deaths of high-ranking al Qaeda leaders and considerable operational- and tactical-level success. Without its network of leaders guiding recruits, making plans, and funneling financial aid, al Qaeda is weakened.  No doubt this is the basis of the intelligence community’s assessment that the magnitude of the threat from the core al Qaeda group in its Pakistani refuge has diminished.

Though it may be true that al Qaeda is not as strong as it used to be, it is still extremely dangerous.   The group has exhibited remarkable resiliency, continuing to survive and evolve despite intense international pressure.  Time after time, major, sophisticated plots have been discovered long after the international security community has made similar assessments of the group’s reduced capability.  Its most recent plots may involve somewhat fewer participants, in general, and have not succeeded in attracting nearly as much attention as the successful 9/11 attacks, but who can say whether the remaining core group is planning something just as big as 9/11?  Indeed, only today, British authorities have made a series of raids that might interrupted one of the biggest terror plots since 9/11, and it is too soon yet to tell whether this plot is linked to the core al Qaeda organization. Perhaps most disturbing is that the successive hardening of security measures in the air industry has done practically nothing to deter al Qaeda’s attempts to attack it.

The United States is investing a lot of financial aid and military support into Yemen now, but it should not be shortsighted in thinking this is the only big threat. Al Qaeda in any country is a threat from all of their affiliated divisions in other countries, and targeting al Qaeda in one country at a time will do little to affect its influence in others. For example, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s headquarters moved to Pakistan; for a time, the group focused its greatest effort in Iraq; now, Yemen seems to be the most threatening. U.S. policy cannot limit its focus on this adaptable target in any one country alone, because the group has a proven record of moving to new safe havens and reestablishing operations and logistical support (such as its finances). Terrorism should be thought as a certain threat, not necessarily as a weakening one, because traditional measures of location-based power do not apply well to groups like al Qaeda. Terrorism has proven to regrow new epicenters all over the world. Assessing al Qaeda as less strong in one place does not mean it has weakened overall.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Background.  Article Two, Section Two, Clause Two of the United States Constitution specifies that the President of the United States shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, so long as two-thirds of the Senators present concur.  The ratification of treaties differs from standard Senate procedure in that it requires this supermajority of affirmative votes to pass.  President Obama and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid contend that they have the votes necessary for ratification of New START, but it now looks unlikely that the Senate will vote on the treaty during the current lame duck session.  But Senator Jon Kyl, the Senate’s most vocal critic of ratification during the lame duck session, told Senator Reid, “I do not think [the treaty can come to a vote now] due to the other work Congress must do.” 

Recently, all 10 of the newly-elected Senators sent a letter to Senator Reid urging him to delay a vote on ratification until the 112^th Congress convenes in January 2011.  In their letter, Senators-elect Blunt, Boozman, Rubio, Johnson, Hoeven, Portman, Kirk, Ayotte, Paul and Moran wrote, “Out of respect to our states’ voters, we believe it would be improper for the Senate to consider the New START treaty or any other treaty in a lame duck session prior to January 3, 2011.  Indeed, no bilateral strategic arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union or Russia has ever been ratified during a lame duck session…We call on you to defer action on this arms control treaty until the Senate reconvenes in the 112^th Congress and we are able to participate fully and in an informed manner on the New START.”

While these new statesmen’s position is commendable, they should have advocated a new treaty and a new strategy that modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, preserve American power, and address the critical issue of missile defense.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.  New START would cap the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 for both the United States and Russia, limit each side to just 700 warhead launchers, place a cap on deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers at 800 apiece, and each party will again have the right to conduct inspections of ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases.  Russia’s immense 10,000-plus tactical Nuclear weapons are not covered by the treaty.  In describing the terms of the treaty, Presidents Obama and Medvedev write:

“Thus treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.  If either party raises the issue of extension of this treaty, the parties shall jointly consider the matter…Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

Since the expiration of the previous START treaty, nearly one year ago, neither side has been able to inspect the other country’s nuclear arsenal, which is partly the reason for urgency.  As the treaty states, “The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers.” The purpose of the inspection is to verify that both signatories comply with the treaty’s terms.  Furthermore, inspection allows each nation to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of the non-deployed strategic offensive arms in each nation’s nuclear arsenal.

Senators’ Concerns.  Senator Jon Kyl, the Republican minority whip, and his colleague John McCain are leading the charge against ratification.  Senator Kyl has argued that the Senate should oppose ratification of New START on the grounds that not specific enough in important areas and weakens American strategic security.  While Senator Kyl has taken issue with the lack of adequate deliberation time in the Senate, his main qualm with the treaty is its many “unresolved issues.”

Two of those unresolved issues include the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces and the assurance that the treaty does not inhibit U.S. missile defense.  On the first point, Kyl has urged President Obama since the onset of deliberation of New START to increase funding for modernization of the aging U.S. nuclear laboratories and the nuclear arms themselves.  In an effort to entice Senator Kyl and his Republican colleagues, President Obama has pledged to spend $4 million on modernizing a dilapidated Arizona nuclear research facility, but Senator Kyl is still urging his Senate colleagues to oppose ratification of New START.  Kyl told the Wall Street Journal that he is not convinced that Senator Obama is serious about providing adequate funding for modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  President Obama has dubbed the ratification of New START one of the most important foreign policy objectives of his presidency, and it is therefore unlikely that he can entirely ignore objections.

Senate Republicans have also expressed their displeasure with the treaty’s failure to address ballistic missile defense.  Senator Kyl has pressed President Obama in recent days on this point but has yet to receive a response.  Kyl has previously stated that until the president provides assurance that New START does not inhibit American missile defense, he will block its passage.

In 2009, President Obama proposed cutting $1.2 billion in missile defense and eliminated key missile defense projects such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and the Airborne Laser.  In the 2010 defense budget, President Obama made further cuts to American missile defense.  At the time of this writing, America’s missile defense budget is $600 million lower than it was at the onset of Obama’s presidency. The concerns expressed by Senators Jon Kyl, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Jim DeMint over New START’s failure to address missile defense are warranted.  Development of a robust and technologically advanced missile defense system should be a foremost priority of the United States Congress and the Department of Defense.

Scholars’ Concerns.  National security scholars have raised several other problems with New START.  First and foremost, Republican Senators have said that they want to delay ratification of the treaty until the 112^th Congress convenes on January 3, 2010.  But many conservative experts believe New START should be scrapped and a new treaty negotiated altogether.  Second, the Senators have not focused much on the issues of sharing telemetric information with Russia, the forced reduction of U.S. offensive and defensive weapons and weapon launchers, or New STARTs embrace of a Cold War mindset.  John Bolton, describing his vexation with the New START Treaty, writes, “Less-well-understood-but profoundly misguided—is the treaty’s return to outmoded Cold War limits on weapons launchers, which will require the United States, but not Russia, to dismantle existing delivery systems.  This could cripple America’s long-range conventional warhead delivery capabilities, while also severely constraining our nuclear flexibility.”  This problem alone should prompt opposition to ratification of New START.

While the sharing of telemetric information may foster cordial relations between the signatories, it is detrimental to American strategic security.  Dr. James Carafano, a national security fellow at the Heritage Foundation, notes that the treaty requires the two signatories to share missile defense and test flight data.  Russia could use this information to develop strategies for countering U.S. missile defense or share this information with Iran, North Korea, or other rogues.  The sharing of this kind of information poses a grave threat to American strategic security and the stability of the free world.

Dr. Carafano, summarizing conservative opposition to New START, writes, “Conservatives oppose the treaty not because they are ‘partisan’ (as the White House routinely claims) but because they see the treaty as useless in limiting proliferation, detrimental to missile defense, and counter to the purpose of defense treaties—defending and protecting American from her enemies.” Rather than delaying the vote to ratify New START, conservatives should urge the negotiation of a more “American friendly” treaty with the Russian government.

A Better Alternative: Strengthening the Moscow Treaty.  Instead of ratifying the New START Treaty, a better idea would be to strengthen and renew the Moscow Treaty of 2002 before it expires on December 31, 2012.  The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction, or the Moscow Treaty, was created by George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin and limits each signatory to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads.  John Bolton, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, examined the fundamental differences between the Moscow and New START treaties.  Mr. Bolton, in describing the fundamental differences between the treaties, wrote:

“In pursuing New START, the Obama administration has essentially jettisoned the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, which only dealt with the limitation of nuclear warheads that were operationally deployed.  That freed large numbers of U.S. launchers (land-based ballistic missiles, along with heavy bombers such as the B-2) to carry conventional payloads world-wide—a concept known as conventional prompt global strike.”

Mr. Bolton argues that the United States should abandon the New START treaty and instead strengthen the provisions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.  Limiting operationally deployed warheads, not delivery mechanisms—which the United States needs to be able to project conventional power—should be the focal point of U.S. arms control agreements. 

The fundamental differences between the Moscow Treaty and New START are five-fold.  First, the 2002 Moscow Treaty properly moved the U.S.-Russian relationship away from one premised on mutual threats of nuclear annihilation in which the balance of nuclear power was at the center of the relationship.  Conversely, New START is designed to preserve the “second strike,” retaliation-based deterrence policies of the Cold War, with Russia assuming the role of the former Soviet Union.  If the New START Treaty were ratified, the United States would wrongly return to an outdated, Cold War-era strategic posture.

Second, New START is designed to codify strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Russia.  The Moscow Treaty did not.  Further, New START will jettison U.S. strategic flexibility and leave virtually no margin for error.

Third, the Moscow Treaty did not place limitations on U.S. strategic defensive and offensive development and deployment options.  Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation notes that this feature of the Moscow Treaty permitted greater flexibility for the United States in its broader strategic posture.  But the New START Treaty limits the number of offensive and defensive strategic weapons in the American nuclear arsenal.

Fourth, Baker Spring notes that the implications for U.S. security stemming from ambiguity in New START regarding U.S. missile defense options are far graver than those stemming from the term “strategic nuclear warheads” used in the Moscow Treaty.  The New START Treaty fails to address the issue of missile defense, American first strike-capabilities, and the importance of modernizing the U.S. missile defense arsenal.  The Russians have made it clear that they will exploit the ambiguity of the treaty’s language on missile defense.

Finally, the New START Treaty and its associated strategy fail to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal and nuclear laboratories.  Baker Spring notes that in 2002-2003, the Bush administration outlined a specific plan for modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the aging nuclear research laboratories as a complement to the Moscow Treaty.  Upon gaining control of both houses of Congress in 2006, Democrats blocked President Bush’s modernization plan.  Modernization of the American nuclear arsenal should be a foremost priority of any arms control agreement and strategy.

Conclusion.  Conservatives are not opposed to an arms control treaty with the Russian government.  Rather, they oppose any treaty that compromises American nuclear secrets, weakens American strategic security, or fails to adequately address missile defense.  The White House urgently needs to negotiate a treaty that protects American vital interests; New START does not.

This Foreign Policy section of the Weekly Political Forecast is authored by PAI’s Deputy Policy Director.

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Iraq is no different. The 2003 American invasion gave the Kurds hope that their goal for self-governance would be realized. As the day of American withdrawal approaches, Kurdish self-governance becomes more plausible. Since 1991, the Iraqi Kurds governed a semiautonomous region, called Kurdistan, within Iraq, and the president of the region, Massoud Barzani, has helped to make it the most prosperous region of Iraq. It has its own army, intelligence service, parliament, government and judiciary and holds its own elections. Additionally, the Iraqi national elections of this year gave Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party a majority in the Kurdish portion of the Iraqi Parliament.

Currently, Arab and Kurdish officials largely argue over power-sharing arrangements in the Kirkuk region, the extent of federalism within the Iraqi state, the terms of a new oil law and several different territorial disputes. Attempts by Arab and Kurd officials to work on these contentious issues have been, at times, resisted successfully by violent insurgents. American troops have played a large role in dealing with these insurgents and in negotiating through crises between the Arabs and Kurds themselves; without their help, things could take a turn for the worse.

It is uncertain what really will happen as the American withdrawal from Iraq continues, but the likelihood of an increase in uprisings and violence against Kurdish and Arab efforts to work together are substantial. The United States is preparing to maintain some presence in northern Iraq, opening embassy branch offices in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk that will enable American diplomats to continue work on Arab and Kurdish issues. But the Kurds’ longstanding goal of autonomy is as strong as ever and could prove to be a major obstacle to long-term Iraqi reconstruction, and the United States needs to take into serious consideration the stakes of the Kurdish-Arab issue as it decides how much to withdraw its involvement in Iraq, because all efforts to stabilize the country may be reversed if this part of the problem is ignored.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.