More impactful to the current situation in Libya is that of these fighters, 3.4% come from Misratah (aka Misrata), 23.9% from Benghazi and 60.2% from Darnah, all being current strongholds in the anti-Gadhafi rebellion.

As reported, Gadhafi himself has recognized the dangers of the city of Darnah as being a hotbed for Al-Qaida and has tried to convince the world AQ is the reason for the uprisings against him.  The international community has rightly disregarded his assertion.  However, the facts derived from the Sinjar reports and West Point’s analysis are important to keep in mind as U.S., NATO and UN military operations continue and possibly grow in scope.

Dissimilar to the Egyptian rebellion, where Al-Qaida was absent in the movement and had little to no foothold in the country, the United States and NATO allies must be cautious in the progression of their involvement in Libya with a known radical foothold.   With Gadhafi vowing a long, drawn out fight to the death, there will be significant differences in the ideology of the people fighting, and the longer fighting continues, the higher the possibility that AQ and other extremists with resources and weapons will gain influence when Gadhafi is out of power.

As the debate unfolds on whether or not to arm a large Islamic faction, about whom we know very little, the United State and her allies would do well to recall the lessons learned from arming rebels in a 1980’s Afghanistan.  Nothing is more important than foresight during operations like these.

This commentary and analysis was written by Michael Hopfersperger, Global Security Intern at PAI, and Drew Davis, Executive Director, PAI.  Reach the authors at global.security.intern@paxamericanainstitute.org and execdirector@paxamericanainstitute.org.

This special report identifies 55 clear violations of international law by the Islamic Republic of Iran:

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Nuclear Program/Proliferation Violations: 18

8 IAEA Resolutions,

6 UNSC Resolutions,

4 Treaties/Agreements;

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Crimes Against Humanity: 30

21 UNSC Resolutions,

3 Treaties,

6 G.A. Resolutions;

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Human Rights: 7

7 All Treaties/Agreements;

Each of the below cited conventions, treaties, resolutions, statutes, and agreements was examined individually, assuring reviewers that the sources and information are accurate and were not derived from corrupt or inaccurate online, print or television reports.  It should be noted this report does not evidence every violation of the cited conventions, treaties, resolutions, statutes, and agreements between 1948 and 2011, as entire books have been written on the collusion between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its terrorist proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. This report is intended to provide reviewers with a comprehensive framework with which to judge the actions and declarations of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Download SPECIAL REPORT: Iran’s Violations of International Law 03-2011

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Executive Summary

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the relationship between the United States and Iran has transformed from staunch allies to intractable opponents.  Today, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, support of terrorism and blatant violations of human rights constitute some of the most complex and pressing challenges facing the United States.  This problem is exacerbated by growing pessimism about whether the international community’s diplomatic efforts can compel Iran to comply with its obligations under international law.

This report draws on diverse branches of substantive international law and shows that Iran is in violation of over 50 international laws.  While diplomacy has failed to gain traction, Iran continues to blatantly violate the rights of its citizens, support international terrorism, and advance its nuclear program to the point where it is now well within striking distance of having a nuclear weapon.  Clearly, Iran’s violations of international law pose a grave and pressing threat to the United States and the international community as a whole.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

As a non-nuclear state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran owes a legal duty to the international community to refrain from manufacturing and acquiring nuclear weapons.  These obligations are interpreted by the NPT’s enforcement agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to also require states to provide credible assurance regarding non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Iran’s systematic violations of the NPT are well documented.  Despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Iran’s nuclear work is not consistent with any other application than the development of a nuclear weapon.  Iran continues to conceal its nuclear program and conduct enrichment-related activities, in violation of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, all subsequent IAEA Safeguards Resolutions, and numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Crimes Against Humanity

Iran’s incitements to commit genocide are not only preludes to tragedy, but are crimes in themselves under international law.  Pursuant to the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute of the ICC, Iran has a legal duty to refrain from the threat of genocide or force against members of a group or the political integrity of any other state.  Iran’s public call for Israel to “wiped off the map” is a state-sanctioned call to genocide that threatens the territorial integrity of Israel and contravenes its obligations under international law.

Iran has also violated numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the state-sponsorship of terrorism.  At least thirteen Resolutions have reaffirmed the obligation of Member States to deny all forms of support to terrorists and those supporting terrorism.  As this report will detail, there is compelling evidence that Iran provides training, financial support, and arms shipments to terrorist organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  This is in clear violation of the Security Council resolutions and poses a serious threat to international security.

Human Rights

As a party to several human rights treaties and as a Member State of the United Nations, Iran is legally obligated to protect the civil, political and religious rights of its citizens.  Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been involved in large-scale abuses of human rights, including systematic persecution of religious minorities and severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression and assembly.  This report will detail the failure of Iran to comply with numerous international covenants to which it is a signatory.

Iran in Iraq

Iran’s Qods Force, a wing of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, provides funding, training, weapons and other lethal support to Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition and Iraqi forces.  Despite President Ahmadinejad’s pledge to cut off such support, the United States Department of Defense continues to assert that there has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal militias in Iraq.

Iran’s support of Iraqi militant groups is contrary to six United Nations General Assembly Declarations and thirteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions which prohibit all Member States from using force against the political independence of any other state and impose the duty upon all Member States to refrain from supporting terrorist activities.  Iran’s failure to comply with these obligations remains a significant impediment to stabilizing Iraq.

DADT reflected one priority: minimizing the risk to our nation’s military capabilities.  The underpinnings of the law were carefully studied by Congress and reflect the informed reasoning of those to whom the Constitution gives the sole right to “raise armies, provide and maintain a navy and make the rules for the government thereof.”  In terms of combat effectiveness, American armed forces are the gold standard.  Repealing DADT has posed a serious threat to this effectiveness by weakening our military’s high standard of morale and unit cohesion, which are the quintessence of military capability. 

Distinction Between an “Act” and a “Belief.”  On March 11, 1778, General George Washington discharged Lt. Gotthold F. Enslin, who became the first soldier to be dismissed from the U.S. military for engaging in homosexual conduct.[1]  Prosecuted under charges of “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,” the purposes for eliminating such behavior from the military remained the same throughout the history of our nation.   

In 1993, the Clinton administration sought to lift the military’s ban on homosexual conduct.  After negotiations failed to conform to President Clinton’s agenda, a compromise entitled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was reached.  This policy prohibits military officials from asking servicemembers about their sexual orientation, and further restricts the way in which servicemembers can communicate their sexual orientation to others.  The policy also provides that sexual orientation is not a bar to military service unless it is manifested by a servicemember’s propensity to engage in homosexual conduct.  Even if a servicemember has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, the servicemember will not be discharged if it is found that he or she is not a person who has the propensity to engage in homosexual acts.  This propensity provision is critical to the interpretation of DADT and undercuts the arguments of DADT opponents.

DADT is criticized by many, including President Barack Obama, for promoting “lies” among servicemembers who must suppress the expression of their true sexual identity.  This general argument avoids the real issue—the distinction between sexual identity and physical acts in furtherance of that identity.  The plain language of DADT states that homosexuality, by itself, is not automatic grounds for discharge.  The military does not punish a state of mind or a sexual orientation, but rather punishes conduct that threatens the morale and cohesion of the military as a whole.

Unlike a belief, which need not be expressed and arguably cannot be controlled, a sexual advance is a matter entirely of volition.  Prohibitions on homosexual banter and solicitations to engage in homosexual acts have an independent basis for restriction, despite one’s sexual identity.  Attacking DADT on the erroneous assumption that it suppresses one’s identity fails to recognize the critical distinction between a belief and a volitional act.    

Even Christian servicemembers face restrictions as to when and how they may act on their beliefs.  For example, a soldier may not proselytize persons of other faiths.  A Christian servicemember’s faith or belief in God is not punished, but it is acknowledged that forcing faith upon unwilling servicemembers could have a detrimental effect upon unit cohesion.  The military’s prohibition of sexual harassment follows the same logic.  Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the act of sexual harassment is grounds for discharge, which is defined as “influencing . . . another person in exchange for sexual behaviors, or deliberate and offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature.”  Prohibiting servicemembers from engaging in such behavior is consistent with the military’s overall goal of providing our soldiers with an optimal environment that will contribute to our overall success on the battlefield.

The purposes of DADT were exactly the same—preserving unit cohesion and the military’s high standard of morale.  Just as our servicemembers have the ability to control his or her expression and refrain from proselytizing other servicemembers and engaging in sexually harassing conduct, regardless of their beliefs or desires, homosexual servicemembers have the ability to refrain from engaging in homosexual conduct and behavior that suggests intent to engage in homosexual conduct.

Homosexual servicemembers are not living “lies,” nor are their beliefs suppressed, as President Obama has deceptively suggested.  There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces.  Heterosexuals and homosexuals alike must conform to the standards that were created to preserve morale and combat effectiveness.  The repeal efforts became the product of misinterpretation of DADT and uninformed social experimentation.  This is risky, especially during a time of global war against terrorism, when the United States is asking its military to perform some of the most complicated and diverse operations it has ever attempted. 

Consequences of Repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Previous Congressional findings supporting DADT reflect the common-sense observation that military effectiveness would be compromised if homosexual conduct were to be allowed:

 “One of the most crucial elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual unit members. . . .  The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.[2]

These findings are corroborated with various studies and polls that suggest the damaging effect that homosexual conduct would have on unit cohesion.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted 125 focus groups to understand military culture and concluded that “the vast majority of military personnel believe that homosexual men and women serving openly in the military would undermine cohesion.”[3]  Retention of soldiers is also threatened by a repeal of DADT and is often overlooked.  A 2008 Military Times survey indicated that almost 10 percent of soldiers would leave if the law is repealed, and 14 percent would consider leaving.

DADT enjoyed strong support among long-serving members of the armed service who have been charged with ensuring military readiness.  More than 1,000 retired flag and general officers personally signed a statement addressed to the president and Congress urging continuing support for DADT.  This represents the largest number of American senior officers to jointly convey their recommendations on a single issue in the history of our nation.  Since only one fourth of all Congressional members have any military service experience of their own, the advice of our military’s high-ranking and long-serving members should not have been ignored.

Conclusion.  The glue of our military’s effectiveness is what the ancient Greeks called philia—friendship, comradeship and brotherly love, which the military defines as “unit cohesion.”  A premium is placed on unit cohesion because it has been shown to be critical to battlefield success.  The DADT debate—still not dead, as the Pentagon still has substantial power in determining how to interpret and implement the measure’s repeal—should not focus on philosophical discussions about homosexuality in American society, but should focus on military effectiveness and the grave problem that the repeal of DADT could pose to the security of the American people.

The American nation depends on its military and elected leadership to make the best decisions for the armed forces as a whole—not just a limited group, and not simply to fulfill campaign promises and be politically correct.  Congress, as charged by the Constitution of the United States, must exercise its duty to preserve our military’s high standard of readiness, effectiveness, and unit cohesion by providing the men and women of our armed forces with an optimal environment to do their job of defending our great nation.

This National Security section of the Weekly Political Forecast is authored by PAI’s Correspondent for Legal Studies.

[2] 10 U.S.C. § 654 (6), (14), (15).

[3] Edwin Dorn and Howard Graves, “American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century,” CSIS Report, The CSIS Press, February 2000.

The main benefit from declaring Wikileaks a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) would be restricting financial support to the organization.  The primary effect of an FTO designation is to make illegal any material support for the organization by any US person or corporation; secondary effects include international corporations and organizations being aware of potential negative reactions to any funding or support provided to an FTO.  The net effect would likely be a more pronounced and severe curtailing or withdrawal of resources made available to Wikileaks, as can be seen by Amazon.com’s withdrawal of “cloud services” .  This may have the desired effect of reducing the leaking of classified information, although it is notoriously hard, especially in the internet age, to quash the publishing of specific information by attacking individual publishers.

However, there are serious concerns about whether Wikileaks can even classify as an FTO under the executive order.  FTOs must “(1)involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (2) appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.” While there is an argument that the information being leaked will cause danger to human life and property through retaliation and similar tangential causes, that argument has generally been rejected as too removed of a cause by the Supreme Court when it comes to publishing or speech; as well, the second criterion is very unlikely to be satisfied.

There are also serious constitutional and policy concerns with taking significant action against what many would consider a “publisher” of information.  The freedom of the press has been strongly defended throughout U.S. history, although exactly where that freedom ends and the ability for the government to protect national security by restricting dissemination of classified information begins is a very hazy line.   The publishing of leaked information has very rarely been punished in the United States, and there is general consensus that this strong protection of the media, the press, is very valuable and thus worthy of strong protection; the burden and punishment for disclosure of classified or sensitive information has always fallen on the “leaker” themselves, and not those who disseminate the information. See: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.; Snepp v. United States; New York Times Co. v United States.

The present issue is somewhat more complicated, as Wikileaks has actively pursued and openly requested any and all classified information, as opposed to more specific, story based information.  This distinction is meaningful legally, as it makes a case for conspiracy with, or aiding and abetting, someone leaking information, which is an explicit criminal act.

Therefore, the policy considerations at hand need to properly balance the government’s ability to protect its sensitive information with the public’s need for information and government transparency.  As the main benefit of transparency is to prevent unethical or otherwise unacceptable actions by the government, the current whistleblower bill in Congress should help to provide an outlet for people who see no other recourse besides leaking classified information in violation of federal law.  While a line must be drawn that protects the inherent right to free press of the people and sensitive government operations,  this likely involves little liability or punishment for publishers as it is a very slippery slope once government can regulate what can and cannot be openly published.

List of current FTOs as designated by the U.S. Department of State:

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

For a concise, though detailed, compilation of U.S. cases relevant to the disclosure of classified information, see Cases and Materials on U.S. Law and National Security, Second Edition, Ron Sievert, 2006.

Attention in Afghanistan has been consistently focused on the next military move or political strategy to be tried next. To outsiders, it is difficult to translate what something like that would mean in American cities and towns. Fighting is happening in areas no different than towns around the world. There are people, jobs, houses, parks, and whole livelihoods in which this fighting is occurring, and it is all too easy to get caught up in the military aspect of war and disregard the human factors.

More and more villagers seek refuge in areas outside of the fighting. These villagers are told they will be compensated for damages, but the process and outcomes can be complicated. Afghani citizens have to apply for compensation through their local boroughs, which have to contact the coalition countries whose armies damaged property. Sometimes the request never makes it, or the request goes unheard. Other times, the Taliban terrorize anyone who tries to reach out to ask for foreign aid. Citizens who come from areas where fighting is still going on are often left unheard. Jobless and barely making ends meet, these families have nowhere to go. Without knowing when the fighting will end, these families are left unheard.

One important purpose of the American-led coalition’s presence in Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban is to make the lives of the locals better. Coalition forces stand to gain valuable allies in the local citizenry for their counterinsurgency campaign if they value the Afghan people’s partnership, but they risk long-term failure if they fail to recognize the locals’ importance.  NATO and U.S. forces need to remember that in order to do something different, you have to make something different and that a hostile local population would certainly make both the tactical and strategic situations even worse.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

The two bombs were concealed inside printer cartridges and contained the explosive Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), an explosive that al-Qaeda has used in earlier terrorist attempts.  About fourteen ounces of PETN is the equivalent of five pounds of TNT; only one pound of TNT has the capability to destroy a house.  The terrorist branch in Yemen has increased its use of PETN plastic explosives since last year, which has heightened the risk of detection problems.

The United States is currently taking greater security measures with cargo shipments while both Yemeni and American intelligence officials have intensified their search for al-Asiri.

Upon receiving the tip from Saudi intelligence officials about the bombs, American intelligence officials were able to respond promptly.  However, it is particularly alarming that the cargo bombs were detected due to a tip from Saudi intelligence sources rather than by security scanners.  The technology to detect traces of chemical explosives exists, but the production and set-up costs are so high that it is taking a long time to implement this technology at cargo depots.  In light of AQAP’s modus operandi, security technology must be improved and expeditiously installed at our ports of entry while the intelligence community continues to adapt.

Though national security has lately been relegated behind burgeoning economic issues, the United States must continue its efforts to be on the offense to counter terrorist attacks.  The threats Americans face have not diminished, and al-Qaeda is continually looking for weaknesses in U.S. defenses.

The incidents that occurred last week reinforce the importance of ensuring that the President not punish the intelligence community or force premature deadlines for the withdrawal of American troops overseas.  Artificial deadlines for troop withdrawal make Taliban and al-Qaeda victory merely a matter of time and fail to accomplish the strategic American objective of denying safe havens to these forces.

Additionally, the current administration’s threat to prosecute intelligence officials and the “Wikileaks” situation are very dangerous because American credibility is undermined abroad.  The main reason why the cargo was intercepted in this most recent attack was because of the Saudi intelligence tip.  If other countries and intelligence agencies are unsure whether the information they share with the United States will risk their own well-being or that of their agents, the ability to thwart terrorist attacks is severely diminished.  It is essential that the United States remain on the offensive and sustain its alliance in order to counter terrorist attempts in the future.

Archana Vuyyuru is PAI’s Intern in Homeland Security Affairs.

Iran consistently denies that its nuclear development has any purpose beyond civilian use, but its actions say differently. Iran has made IAEA inspections difficult to execute, even banning some inspectors from the premises. Iran’s refusal to cooperate in answering IAEA questions raises legitimate concerns about its intentions. The United States has given Iran plenty of opportunities to compromise and settle this issue, but Iran wavers between saying it would like to enter into talks and then retreating when the time draws nigh. The most recent effort from U.S. President Barack Obama to open talks with Iran was compromised when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made outrageous assertions before the UN General Assembly about a supposed U.S. conspiracy surrounding the 9/11 attacks.

While some countries have left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue their own nuclear programs, Iran has taken a different approach by remaining a party to the treaty even as it blatantly continues to construct new nuclear infrastructure and clandestinely enrich nuclear material in clear violation of the treaty’s terms. The only possible reason for this is to attempt to lend some sort of credence to Iran’s fiction that its nuclear program truly is aimed at merely non-military use.

A country that claims to have purely peaceful intentions should not spend so much time dodging inspections and questions as Iran is doing. Such a country should have no problem in making its nuclear program transparent, but Iran’s actions are at best suspicious. There are too many misaligned factors which point toward Iran having alternative intentions for the nuclear material it is producing.  Perhaps the most obvious of these is that Iran admits new nuclear capability or developmental achievements only after it has been caught doing so by Western inspectors, intelligence agencies, or journalists.  Such a policy blatantly violates both the letter and the spirit of the NPT.

The United Nations was conceived to be the enforcer of this sort of agreement, but its sanctions, while sometimes very strict, are all but impossible to enforce in the absence of committed individual states. The United Nations relies too much on trust that companies and countries will comply with its decisions rather than actually enforcing anything; it really does not have an executive mechanism for doing so. Proper enforcement should be established to prevent black-market exchanges or any transactions infringing upon these sanctions.

Another enforcing problem arises when it comes to the IAEA inspections. If Iran is not complying, and the inspections are not sufficient, then why do the attempts at inspection continue in their current state? The only thing these inspections are confirming is Iran’s suspicious manner toward its nuclear program, because their limitations prevent much in the way of genuine investigation beyond what the UN’s member states’ intelligence services already provide.  The IAEA should look within to correct its weaknesses.

Even though the latest U.S. sanctions appear to be having some effect on the Iranian regime, the United States may be digging itself deeper into harsh relations with Iran and its allies. The United States is pulling a lot of weight on its own, and doing it publically. Many interests in the Middle East already see the United States as the bully in the playground. While America’s intentions are right, it needs to be cautious as to what exactly it aims to affect within Iran. All measures should target the Iranian government and military, not civilian life, to the extent possible without compromising their effectiveness. Proper surveillance on how sanctions are affecting Iran’s civilian population should be established and maintained, or else the United States may compromise its reputation among civilian radicals as it has done in the past.

All indications point to Iranian dedication to achieving its true objective of nuclear weapons capability.  Such an outcome is unacceptable to the United States and is likely to reinforce all the existing security problems already posed by Iran by an order of magnitude.  Now is the time to take effective measures to prevent such a highly undesirable development before it becomes impossible to confront Iran in any way.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

The most telling part of Shariah being incompatable with Western civilization is that “any system of man-made law is considered illicit under Islamic law” (page 43).  Shariah is directly at odds with our governmental system, and in strict interpretation makes no compromise for any other rule of law.  Other issues include the treatment of women and non-Muslims as inferior; obligatory female genital mutilation; parents permitted to murder children for “honor”; anti-semitism; Taqiyya (permissible lying and misrepresentation to protect Muslims or Islam); and permitted spousal rape (pages 41-54).  This report emphasizes significant evidence that large and powerful groups of Muslims still adhere to the strict and uncompromising interpretation of Shariah.

The report acknowledges that there is potential for peaceful co-existence, and that some Muslims have interpreted both the Quran and Shariah in such a manner to be compatible with U.S. Constitutional rights.  However, a significant portion of Muslims are either in favor of a more rigid and extreme interpretation which leaves no room for anything else but Shariah, or are unwilling to stand up against the more rigid interpretations.  This is understandable, since the punishment imposed by Shariah law for apostasy is death (pages 14, 42).

This issue is of the utmost importance to Americans due to the critical threat posed against the American way of life.  It is impossible to protect ourselves from perceived threats if we do not know the extent or depth of the threat.  Especially troubling is the report’s evidence that investigations into the threat have been suppressed by administrators—including at the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, police departments, and other federal and local agencies—most likely attributed to “willful blindness” and the “proclivity of Americans…to accommodate even troubling conduct in the name of religious tolerance, multiculturalism and political correctness” (page 244).  The U.S. government has actually adopted explicit policies, recommended by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, that “no reference to Islam, jihad, or Shariah may be made” in security documents (pages 247-248).

The action that needs to be taken is simple and obvious.  We must value open discourse over this possible threat, instead of suppressing it publicly through “political correctness” and systematically through government policy.  With proper discourse and availability of information, our whole society can properly assess the threat to the United States and respond appropriately.  While there is some historical merit to the fear of race- or religious-based oppression and discrimination, the United States is clearly capable of reacting justly to specific, actual threats; however, it can only do so if allowed to operate without cumbersome, politically correct restrictions on information and analysis.   History has clearly shown time and again that ignoring or pacifying a potential threat out of fear does nothing but allow the threat to grow and hinder our ability to understand and properly react to a threat.

Jason Myatt is a PAI intern in National Security Law.

At first glance, this disagreement only involved Japan and China, but the longstanding strategic alliance of the United States and Japan necessarily tempers the long term affects.  Though not immediately obvious, one of the most important developments occurred when U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen stated, “[O]bviously, we’re very, very strongly in support of… our ally in that region, Japan.”  Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed this sentiment, stating that the United States will “fulfill our alliance responsibilities” toward Japan.  While these comments did not come directly from the president, they served to remind the Chinese that any negative action taken against Japan will be viewed as a threat against the United States.  Thus, the most important implications of this crisis were related to strategic geopolitics.

Meanwhile, the Russians made an interesting play. President Dmitry Medvedev scheduled a trip to the Southern Kurils, the subject of ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and Russia.  Medvedev was unable to actually visit the Kurils, because of adverse weather, but claimed that they are “a very important region for our country,” adding, “I will definitely go there in the near future.”  While these actions and comments fall short of overt support for the Chinese position, they are evidence that the Russians and Chinese share a common territorial interest contrary to Japan’s.

Further, China and Russia have been strengthening their economic ties recently and have plans to continue this growth.  On September 27, Russia and China signed a joint agreement to boost an energy cooperative that will link the growth of both countries for years to come.  The agreement was signed at a ceremony to open a newly constructed oil pipeline that will transport Russian oil to China for consumption.  This 20-year deal is substantial on its own, but an even more significant development is the likelihood of a deal that would send Russian natural gas to China beginning in 2015. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, says, “Russia is ready to meet China’s full demand in gas.”

Overall, the previous points do not necessarily prove that the continued alliance of the United States and Japan has pushed China and Russia closer together, but there are some indications that this is true.  At the very least, the evidence points to the Russian government supporting China economically and, to a lesser degree, politically.  The question that should be in the minds of American policymakers is whether the current ties between Russia and China are simply a marriage of economic and political convenience or if they indicate the beginning of a more profound strategic relationship.

This section of the Weekly Political Forecast is authored by PAI’s Fellow in Energy Security Policy.

North Korea’s history of abiding by the norms of the international community has been far from spotless. Just during the past four years, the dictatorship has blatantly disregarded all UN Security Council resolutions passed in association with the nation, most notably Resolution 1695 and Resolution 1718, each drafted in 2006, which demand that North Korea “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.” As recently as April 2009, Pyongyang test-launched a long-range missile; even though that test was widely considered a failure in the intelligence community, the missile still traveled roughly 1,300 miles past Japan.

For many years, the following plutonium-based nuclear facilities have been known to exist in North Korea at a place called Yongbyon, roughly 60 miles from the DPRK capital in Pyongyang: (1) An atomic reactor capable of producing six kilograms of plutonium annually; (2) two large (incomplete, currently disabled) reactors capable of producing a projected 200 kilograms of plutonium annually; (3) a 600-foot plutonium reprocessing plant.

North Korea appears to have mastered the engineering prerequisites of plutonium production. It has demonstrated its knowledge of operating a nuclear reactor, separating plutonium from the fuel rods, and has taken significant steps towards weaponization of these materials. By the end of 2009, the DPRK declared that it had successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. Less than one year ago, it was estimated that North Korea had a stockpile of plutonium between 30-50 kilograms, enough to construct an estimated five or six nuclear weapons, which number assumes it would require the IAEA standard of eight kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. Additionally, Dr. Sigfried Hecker, during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, estimated that North Korea has resumed its reprocessing of plutonium and will be capable of enriching enough fuel to produce one nuclear bomb each year. In addition to the already convoluted and contradictory stream of information available to the general public, statements made by government officials seem to allude to an uncertainty about the North’s nuclear warhead production capability and level of sophistication. In January of 2009, an American scholar who had visited the DPRK was told 30.8 kg had been weaponized, with no further specification regarding whether or not this plutonium had been installed in warheads.

Due to the overwhelming policy of secrecy on behalf of the North Korean government, little has been publicized regarding the exact state of North Korea’s nuclear program. A primary concern at this point is whether or not North Korea has successfully pursued an alternate route to a uranium-fueled bomb. The U.S. can speak with absolute certainty that North Korea is in control of the necessary equipment and blueprints for such a program, which directly violates the Agreed Framework treaty signed years ago by the North as well as other multilateral agreements.  In addition, North Korea has a delivery system potentially capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States in the Taepo-Dong 2 long-range missile; however, this weapon has proved unreliable in recent tests.

Historically, North Korea has used national holidays to demonstrate new capability or launch provocative tests of new weapons, and on October 10th, the North will mark Party Founding Day. North Korea has been known to lash out at enemies, particularly when they are perceived as either weak or distracted, and then there often follows a period of negotiation for concessions in order to return to peace. Because of the distractions the American military currently face, some scholars are projecting the threat of a provocative and illegal nuclear test to be very high in these upcoming months, and North Korea might well use recent American-South Korean military drills as a handy excuse for renewed provocation.

This National Security section of the Weekly Political Forecast is written by PAI’s Analyst in National Security Affairs.