For years, CIA and other military efforts have barraged Pakistan with missile strikes. Many of these efforts have resulted in the deaths of high-ranking al Qaeda leaders and considerable operational- and tactical-level success. Without its network of leaders guiding recruits, making plans, and funneling financial aid, al Qaeda is weakened.  No doubt this is the basis of the intelligence community’s assessment that the magnitude of the threat from the core al Qaeda group in its Pakistani refuge has diminished.

Though it may be true that al Qaeda is not as strong as it used to be, it is still extremely dangerous.   The group has exhibited remarkable resiliency, continuing to survive and evolve despite intense international pressure.  Time after time, major, sophisticated plots have been discovered long after the international security community has made similar assessments of the group’s reduced capability.  Its most recent plots may involve somewhat fewer participants, in general, and have not succeeded in attracting nearly as much attention as the successful 9/11 attacks, but who can say whether the remaining core group is planning something just as big as 9/11?  Indeed, only today, British authorities have made a series of raids that might interrupted one of the biggest terror plots since 9/11, and it is too soon yet to tell whether this plot is linked to the core al Qaeda organization. Perhaps most disturbing is that the successive hardening of security measures in the air industry has done practically nothing to deter al Qaeda’s attempts to attack it.

The United States is investing a lot of financial aid and military support into Yemen now, but it should not be shortsighted in thinking this is the only big threat. Al Qaeda in any country is a threat from all of their affiliated divisions in other countries, and targeting al Qaeda in one country at a time will do little to affect its influence in others. For example, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s headquarters moved to Pakistan; for a time, the group focused its greatest effort in Iraq; now, Yemen seems to be the most threatening. U.S. policy cannot limit its focus on this adaptable target in any one country alone, because the group has a proven record of moving to new safe havens and reestablishing operations and logistical support (such as its finances). Terrorism should be thought as a certain threat, not necessarily as a weakening one, because traditional measures of location-based power do not apply well to groups like al Qaeda. Terrorism has proven to regrow new epicenters all over the world. Assessing al Qaeda as less strong in one place does not mean it has weakened overall.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Background.  Article Two, Section Two, Clause Two of the United States Constitution specifies that the President of the United States shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, so long as two-thirds of the Senators present concur.  The ratification of treaties differs from standard Senate procedure in that it requires this supermajority of affirmative votes to pass.  President Obama and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid contend that they have the votes necessary for ratification of New START, but it now looks unlikely that the Senate will vote on the treaty during the current lame duck session.  But Senator Jon Kyl, the Senate’s most vocal critic of ratification during the lame duck session, told Senator Reid, “I do not think [the treaty can come to a vote now] due to the other work Congress must do.” 

Recently, all 10 of the newly-elected Senators sent a letter to Senator Reid urging him to delay a vote on ratification until the 112^th Congress convenes in January 2011.  In their letter, Senators-elect Blunt, Boozman, Rubio, Johnson, Hoeven, Portman, Kirk, Ayotte, Paul and Moran wrote, “Out of respect to our states’ voters, we believe it would be improper for the Senate to consider the New START treaty or any other treaty in a lame duck session prior to January 3, 2011.  Indeed, no bilateral strategic arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union or Russia has ever been ratified during a lame duck session…We call on you to defer action on this arms control treaty until the Senate reconvenes in the 112^th Congress and we are able to participate fully and in an informed manner on the New START.”

While these new statesmen’s position is commendable, they should have advocated a new treaty and a new strategy that modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, preserve American power, and address the critical issue of missile defense.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.  New START would cap the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 for both the United States and Russia, limit each side to just 700 warhead launchers, place a cap on deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers at 800 apiece, and each party will again have the right to conduct inspections of ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases.  Russia’s immense 10,000-plus tactical Nuclear weapons are not covered by the treaty.  In describing the terms of the treaty, Presidents Obama and Medvedev write:

“Thus treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.  If either party raises the issue of extension of this treaty, the parties shall jointly consider the matter…Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

Since the expiration of the previous START treaty, nearly one year ago, neither side has been able to inspect the other country’s nuclear arsenal, which is partly the reason for urgency.  As the treaty states, “The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers.” The purpose of the inspection is to verify that both signatories comply with the treaty’s terms.  Furthermore, inspection allows each nation to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of the non-deployed strategic offensive arms in each nation’s nuclear arsenal.

Senators’ Concerns.  Senator Jon Kyl, the Republican minority whip, and his colleague John McCain are leading the charge against ratification.  Senator Kyl has argued that the Senate should oppose ratification of New START on the grounds that not specific enough in important areas and weakens American strategic security.  While Senator Kyl has taken issue with the lack of adequate deliberation time in the Senate, his main qualm with the treaty is its many “unresolved issues.”

Two of those unresolved issues include the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces and the assurance that the treaty does not inhibit U.S. missile defense.  On the first point, Kyl has urged President Obama since the onset of deliberation of New START to increase funding for modernization of the aging U.S. nuclear laboratories and the nuclear arms themselves.  In an effort to entice Senator Kyl and his Republican colleagues, President Obama has pledged to spend $4 million on modernizing a dilapidated Arizona nuclear research facility, but Senator Kyl is still urging his Senate colleagues to oppose ratification of New START.  Kyl told the Wall Street Journal that he is not convinced that Senator Obama is serious about providing adequate funding for modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  President Obama has dubbed the ratification of New START one of the most important foreign policy objectives of his presidency, and it is therefore unlikely that he can entirely ignore objections.

Senate Republicans have also expressed their displeasure with the treaty’s failure to address ballistic missile defense.  Senator Kyl has pressed President Obama in recent days on this point but has yet to receive a response.  Kyl has previously stated that until the president provides assurance that New START does not inhibit American missile defense, he will block its passage.

In 2009, President Obama proposed cutting $1.2 billion in missile defense and eliminated key missile defense projects such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and the Airborne Laser.  In the 2010 defense budget, President Obama made further cuts to American missile defense.  At the time of this writing, America’s missile defense budget is $600 million lower than it was at the onset of Obama’s presidency. The concerns expressed by Senators Jon Kyl, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Jim DeMint over New START’s failure to address missile defense are warranted.  Development of a robust and technologically advanced missile defense system should be a foremost priority of the United States Congress and the Department of Defense.

Scholars’ Concerns.  National security scholars have raised several other problems with New START.  First and foremost, Republican Senators have said that they want to delay ratification of the treaty until the 112^th Congress convenes on January 3, 2010.  But many conservative experts believe New START should be scrapped and a new treaty negotiated altogether.  Second, the Senators have not focused much on the issues of sharing telemetric information with Russia, the forced reduction of U.S. offensive and defensive weapons and weapon launchers, or New STARTs embrace of a Cold War mindset.  John Bolton, describing his vexation with the New START Treaty, writes, “Less-well-understood-but profoundly misguided—is the treaty’s return to outmoded Cold War limits on weapons launchers, which will require the United States, but not Russia, to dismantle existing delivery systems.  This could cripple America’s long-range conventional warhead delivery capabilities, while also severely constraining our nuclear flexibility.”  This problem alone should prompt opposition to ratification of New START.

While the sharing of telemetric information may foster cordial relations between the signatories, it is detrimental to American strategic security.  Dr. James Carafano, a national security fellow at the Heritage Foundation, notes that the treaty requires the two signatories to share missile defense and test flight data.  Russia could use this information to develop strategies for countering U.S. missile defense or share this information with Iran, North Korea, or other rogues.  The sharing of this kind of information poses a grave threat to American strategic security and the stability of the free world.

Dr. Carafano, summarizing conservative opposition to New START, writes, “Conservatives oppose the treaty not because they are ‘partisan’ (as the White House routinely claims) but because they see the treaty as useless in limiting proliferation, detrimental to missile defense, and counter to the purpose of defense treaties—defending and protecting American from her enemies.” Rather than delaying the vote to ratify New START, conservatives should urge the negotiation of a more “American friendly” treaty with the Russian government.

A Better Alternative: Strengthening the Moscow Treaty.  Instead of ratifying the New START Treaty, a better idea would be to strengthen and renew the Moscow Treaty of 2002 before it expires on December 31, 2012.  The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction, or the Moscow Treaty, was created by George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin and limits each signatory to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads.  John Bolton, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, examined the fundamental differences between the Moscow and New START treaties.  Mr. Bolton, in describing the fundamental differences between the treaties, wrote:

“In pursuing New START, the Obama administration has essentially jettisoned the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, which only dealt with the limitation of nuclear warheads that were operationally deployed.  That freed large numbers of U.S. launchers (land-based ballistic missiles, along with heavy bombers such as the B-2) to carry conventional payloads world-wide—a concept known as conventional prompt global strike.”

Mr. Bolton argues that the United States should abandon the New START treaty and instead strengthen the provisions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.  Limiting operationally deployed warheads, not delivery mechanisms—which the United States needs to be able to project conventional power—should be the focal point of U.S. arms control agreements. 

The fundamental differences between the Moscow Treaty and New START are five-fold.  First, the 2002 Moscow Treaty properly moved the U.S.-Russian relationship away from one premised on mutual threats of nuclear annihilation in which the balance of nuclear power was at the center of the relationship.  Conversely, New START is designed to preserve the “second strike,” retaliation-based deterrence policies of the Cold War, with Russia assuming the role of the former Soviet Union.  If the New START Treaty were ratified, the United States would wrongly return to an outdated, Cold War-era strategic posture.

Second, New START is designed to codify strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Russia.  The Moscow Treaty did not.  Further, New START will jettison U.S. strategic flexibility and leave virtually no margin for error.

Third, the Moscow Treaty did not place limitations on U.S. strategic defensive and offensive development and deployment options.  Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation notes that this feature of the Moscow Treaty permitted greater flexibility for the United States in its broader strategic posture.  But the New START Treaty limits the number of offensive and defensive strategic weapons in the American nuclear arsenal.

Fourth, Baker Spring notes that the implications for U.S. security stemming from ambiguity in New START regarding U.S. missile defense options are far graver than those stemming from the term “strategic nuclear warheads” used in the Moscow Treaty.  The New START Treaty fails to address the issue of missile defense, American first strike-capabilities, and the importance of modernizing the U.S. missile defense arsenal.  The Russians have made it clear that they will exploit the ambiguity of the treaty’s language on missile defense.

Finally, the New START Treaty and its associated strategy fail to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal and nuclear laboratories.  Baker Spring notes that in 2002-2003, the Bush administration outlined a specific plan for modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the aging nuclear research laboratories as a complement to the Moscow Treaty.  Upon gaining control of both houses of Congress in 2006, Democrats blocked President Bush’s modernization plan.  Modernization of the American nuclear arsenal should be a foremost priority of any arms control agreement and strategy.

Conclusion.  Conservatives are not opposed to an arms control treaty with the Russian government.  Rather, they oppose any treaty that compromises American nuclear secrets, weakens American strategic security, or fails to adequately address missile defense.  The White House urgently needs to negotiate a treaty that protects American vital interests; New START does not.

This Foreign Policy section of the Weekly Political Forecast is authored by PAI’s Deputy Policy Director.

Iraq is no different. The 2003 American invasion gave the Kurds hope that their goal for self-governance would be realized. As the day of American withdrawal approaches, Kurdish self-governance becomes more plausible. Since 1991, the Iraqi Kurds governed a semiautonomous region, called Kurdistan, within Iraq, and the president of the region, Massoud Barzani, has helped to make it the most prosperous region of Iraq. It has its own army, intelligence service, parliament, government and judiciary and holds its own elections. Additionally, the Iraqi national elections of this year gave Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party a majority in the Kurdish portion of the Iraqi Parliament.

Currently, Arab and Kurdish officials largely argue over power-sharing arrangements in the Kirkuk region, the extent of federalism within the Iraqi state, the terms of a new oil law and several different territorial disputes. Attempts by Arab and Kurd officials to work on these contentious issues have been, at times, resisted successfully by violent insurgents. American troops have played a large role in dealing with these insurgents and in negotiating through crises between the Arabs and Kurds themselves; without their help, things could take a turn for the worse.

It is uncertain what really will happen as the American withdrawal from Iraq continues, but the likelihood of an increase in uprisings and violence against Kurdish and Arab efforts to work together are substantial. The United States is preparing to maintain some presence in northern Iraq, opening embassy branch offices in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk that will enable American diplomats to continue work on Arab and Kurdish issues. But the Kurds’ longstanding goal of autonomy is as strong as ever and could prove to be a major obstacle to long-term Iraqi reconstruction, and the United States needs to take into serious consideration the stakes of the Kurdish-Arab issue as it decides how much to withdraw its involvement in Iraq, because all efforts to stabilize the country may be reversed if this part of the problem is ignored.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

MEND is an outgrowth of various past organizations and exists to fight for a 50% share of oil revenues to be distributed in the Delta.  Even prior to amnesty talks, there was debate whether MEND is a cohesive organization or a splintering of groups that use the same terrorist name.  Regardless of whether MEND was previously splintered or unified, it appears that the offer of amnesty removed the relatively moderate members from the fight and that the remaining group has become bolder.

Prior to 2009, the typical MEND attack was targeted against oil infrastructure and personnel.  In contrast, the October 1, 2010 attack targeted a civilian area that has no significant ties to the oil industry.  Second, while car bombs have been used in the past, they have been used to warn the government against further attacks on the organization.  This trend displays MEND’s escalating tactics, something that should concern oil companies operating in Nigeria.  Even with the change of tactics, attacks against oil-related targets largely define the organization and serve its goal of forcing oil companies to recognize them as a threat.  This comes at a time when Nigerian exports have been consistently near 2.4 mbbl/day.  MEND attacks are quick and economically devastating, and if MEND is trying to bring the Delta issue to the forefront of the political atmosphere, the oil industry will be the conduit in which it is sent.  Recently, MEND abducted seven people from an offshore oil rig, and another attack of a government guest house and a pipeline occurred in the last two weeks.

MEND has been successful in swiftly knocking out oil production and distribution by hundreds of thousands of barrels per day.  MEND’s attacks have international ramifications, as Nigeria accounts for nearly three percent of world oil production.   MEND has proven its ability to affect production significantly in Nigeria, which the United States relies upon for imports; this poses both a price and consistency of supply problem for the United States.  This influence on American supply partially explains speculation that the United States is involved in trying to find those responsible.

There are significant political ramifications for these attacks.  Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathon is from the Delta states and was instrumental in orchestrating the amnesty initiative.  Therefore, the continued violence detracts from the success that he can claim in calming regional conflicts in Nigeria.  The attack occurred right before a highly contested election in which Goodluck Jonathon is a candidate.

All of the aforementioned facts of these attacks raise significant questions as to who is responsible and who gains from the disarray.  The effect of the attacks on Nigeria is significant economically as well as politically.  Therefore, the United States needs to be active in finding those responsible, since Nigeria is one of few successful African democracies.

It is still unclear whether the attacks on October 1^st and the subsequent attacks were the actions of MEND.  The investigation has led to arrests that have not been linked to MEND, but only time will tell if MEND has changed tactics or splintered as a group.  One thing is certain: information on MEND’s posture will be vital to determine the consistency of oil exports to the United States and for the future of Nigerian elections and stability.

This Foreign Policy section of the Weekly Political Forecast was authored by PAI’s Energy Security Fellow.

Hezbollah came out of this war with a vengeance. While projects are still underway, it has restored and improved much of southern Lebanon. Massive reconstruction projects for both Lebanon’s infrastructure and Hezbollah forces produced results in a surprisingly short amount of time and could not have been realized without a massive amount of money, which neither Lebanon nor Hezbollah had after fighting the war.

Of course, Hezbollah had help. Donations from Iran (totaling hundreds of millions of dollars) and patrons from the Persian Gulf significantly aided Hezbollah in its campaign to rebuild the infrastructure of Lebanon and its own military capacity. Hezbollah claims that its missile stockpile is now three times what it was when the 2006 war began—which number Israel has not disputed. The city of Aita al Shaab, from which Hezbollah attacks were launched on the first day of the 2006 war, has been rebuilt and expanded as a symbol to Israel and the world, as a prime example of Hezbollah’s reconstituted power. Literally scores of huge, new houses face Israel, displaying the level of Hezbollah’s high degree of civil influence in Lebanon and warning Israel about the prospects of another war.

Hezbollah says it does not intend to begin the war against Israel; it does not, however, say it opposes war with Israel. The build-up Hezbollah created is practically inviting war. A reconstruction so massive, especially in terms of its rapid military build-up, is not a deterrence mechanism but rather an example of Hezbollah’s mobility and a display of strategic power. Hezbollah has showed just how quickly it could get back on its feet and fight again. Hezbollah denies ad nauseam that it does not want war and that it is not sending any message to Israel inciting war. Yet they take any chance they get to flaunt their prosperity in the last four years, in terms of infrastructure, influx of inhabitants, increased military forces, and continued support. The question seems to be when, not if, war with Israel will begin again: the build-up has again created the same sort of strategic threat to Israel that it faced in 2006 (if anything, on a greater scale), and a similar military build-up over a period of years preceded Hezbollah’s attacks of 2006.

Hezbollah continues to have a stronghold in southern Lebanon, where Shiite Muslim support is strong, and is backed by several anti-American entities. The spread of Hezbollah’s influence means that Lebanon could soon be lost to the “axis of resistance,” encouraging gains for the infectious power of the Iranian regime there and in other countries in the Middle East. This will not be good for the United States and flies in the face of American values. The United States and United Nations may want to consider a helping Israel maintain a destructive deterrence policy. Hezbollah needs to understand the stakes: war with Israel at this point in time may destroy its newly rebuilt southern life.  But the United States, Israel, and all of the West must also understand the stakes of permitting militant Islam to spread in this strategically important part of the world and move to prevent it.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.

On October 25^th, Karzai admitted to taking “bags” of money from Iran, as was first reported two days earlier. Money has been funneled through Karzai’s Chief of Staff Mohammad Omar Daudzai, former Ambassador to Iran and member of Hezb-i-Islami, a hard line fundamentalist group. Hezb-i-Islami was created during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to fight the occupation and has recently become one of the groups the Afghan government has been meeting with to broker a peace deal.  President Karzai has acknowledged that he has received the Iranian money, reportedly between $1 million to $2 million and up to as much as $6 million, occurring once or twice per year.

It is understandable for Karzai to sense that he requires closer regional friends, considering recent elections in Afghanistan that were mired with fraud, discrediting a quarter of the ballots, and the recent news that the United States might indict Karzais’ brother on tax evasion.  But the Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan did not even acknowledge the payments; it is therefore difficult to tell what Iran really wants from this exchange.  Karzai admitted that Iran has asked for “good relations in return and for lots of other things in return.”

These incidents underscore the pressing need for the United States to maintain its commitment to the creation of a strategic partner in Afghanistan, as dangerous anti-American forces have proven willing and able to influence power vacuums where American influence appears vulnerable.

Five of the seven countries have signed a new accord which would effectively free them to use more Nile water for irrigation projects and dams.  The accord would require a simple majority of the countries to approve a project, ignoring Egypt’s and Sudan’s current veto power; Congo and Burundi have not taken sides yet, and Egypt and Sudan have withdrawn from negotiations at this time.  They have until May 2011 to resume negotiations, at which time the new accord will take effect.

Perhaps the most important, yet most easily overlooked, aspect of this very important issue is that there are no international laws governing the use of communal, international rivers like the Nile.  These issues are handled through arrangements and treaties between the involved countries, but in the end there is nothing actually stopping the upstream countries from implementing whatever projects they want, besides the threat of repercussions.  The only direct action that could be taken by Egypt or Sudan if diplomacy were to fail is physical intervention or armed conflict. Indirect actions, such as complaining to the international community and hoping for sanctions, embargos, boycotts, or the like may or may not be effective and would certainly require significant time to have any effect.

This creates a very problematic political situation beyond Africa, too: many countries, including China and several Gulf states, have vested interests in the upstream countries’ agricultural developments, which would rely on additional access to water—well beyond their current usage.  Egypt and Sudan, however, feel that they have a right to the water reserved to them by the Colonial treaty and that upstream countries’ development projects would be effectively stealing their water and threatening their livelihoods if the projects move forward.  As well, many Egyptian and Sudanese farmers are using farming practices which are thousands of years old and are very wasteful in terms of water.  Significant changes in water access would likely threaten them to change their methods or risk failure.

It is difficult to say what the results will be if the upstream countries follow through on their agreement and implement programs in their own countries against Egypt’s and Sudan’s wishes and, if an armed conflict happens, what the results of that conflict would be.  Overt armed conflict is certainly not out of the question, as the region has had many disputes over water supplies or projects to attempt to divert or retain water sources, many of much smaller scale than the Nile.

Perhaps the most significant strategic issue to the United States is Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal, through which a significant portion of the world’s sea trade occurs, especially oil.  The canal has been blockaded historically in times of conflict, and it is not outside the realm of possibility that the threat of restricting access, or closing the canal entirely, would be used to attempt to “encourage” international intervention on the side of Egypt.

Fortunately, in this case, there is probably enough water in the Nile for everyone if it is managed reasonably.  The affected countries will ideally be able to come to a diplomatic solution to the situation, allowing upstream countries to use their water resources and develop their infrastructure without forcing undue burdens on the downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt.  The United States has an interest now in promoting peaceful negotiation among all concerned parties and finding a reasonable solution agreeable to everyone.

Jason Myatt is a PAI Intern in National Security Law.

In 2008, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, raising questions about the regime’s plan of succession.  Though the United States expects Kim Jong-il to remain in power until his death, political signals sent by the North Korean regime have spurred wide belief that the transfer of power to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, has already begun.

The day before the party congress, Kim Jong-un was promoted to the position of general in the powerful National Defence Commission, along with Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyong-hui, and five other prominent party members to the same position in the Korean People’s Army. Then, at the party congress, Kim Jong-un was elected Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, second in command only to Kim Jong-Il himself. These promotions are designed to set up a support system to mentor Kim Jong-il’s chosen successors in the event of his death.  In this, the North Korean government appears to be in a tremendous hurry. This process represents the first stage of the only pure dynastic succession of power remaining in the modern world.

In some respects, the events of last week mirror what happened during the last power transition in North Korea.  In addition to the elaborate and extensive convention, North Korea took the unusual step of releasing video of its leader.  In direct comparison, after the party conference in 1980, Kim Jong-il announced to the outside world that he would succeed his father as Supreme Leader, after having been named heir to the position years earlier, in 1974. Power did not transfer to Kim Jong-il until the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994, which allowed Kim Jong-il almost two full decades to be groomed for the position. But to date, Kim Jong-un has only had about two years so far to be similarly groomed.   Thus, it is not fully certain whether Kim Jong-un’s appointment to general necessarily represents an official anointment or, rather, the beginning of a longer training period.

Even the North Korean people know little about their leader’s presumed successor.  It is likely that they had never even seen Kim Jong-un until last week’s convention. He is believed to be extremely inexperienced in domestic politics, international affairs, and military affairs. If and when he actually assumes power, the expected hazard is that he will be compelled to create visible examples of his power as Supreme Leader, probably to include military displays.  For example, it is probable that the North’s sinking of the South Korean destroyer Cheonan was linked to Kim Jong-un’s need to “win his spurs” and gain the respect of his country’s military leadership.

North Korea represents an obviously unique case in contemporary global politics. Convincing both the public and the elite that a man still in his twenties can and should succeed Kim Jong-il as Supreme Leader must be an arduous task. Kim Jong-il has focused on his successor’s strengths as a leader who can take the country successfully into the 21st century. Skills such as his computer expertise as well as his youth have been spun to be seen in a promising light instead of skepticism. Poems, songs and posters have been circulated among the populace in order to ease the minds of those who fear the worst.

The choice of Kim Jong-un as North Korea’s heir would remain puzzling if not for the fact that this will be the third generation of North Korean dictators monopolized by a single family. One ironic advantage that he has is the similarity of his appearance to his grandfather, the founder of the North Korean communist state, Kim Il-sung. Reports have shown a marked attempt by the North Korean government in its propaganda to emphasize this similarity in order to garner support for the future leader of the state.

Jake Eschenburg is a PAI Analyst in National Security Affairs.

After the 2009 Japanese elections, analysts warned of a weakening Japanese-U.S. alliance as Japanese ties with China were supposed to strengthen.  What a difference a year can make.  At a moment when a new Japanese government rose to power talking about greater regional economic and security integration and the decline of U.S. power, China decided to become more aggressive, effectively reminding other East Asian powers why the United States is so essential to their security.  China’s military buildup, failure to condemn North Korea, and generally aggressive attitude have reignited concern amongst China’s neighbors over what role China plans to play as it increases its regional influence.

Other Asian countries have taken note of China’s growing military power. India’s new military strategy calls for India to fight a two front war. Vietnam has been seeking closer defensive ties. South Korea is again firmly in the U.S. camp after North Korea’s naval attack and China’s decision to effectively side with North Korea.

What should the United States do? America has interests in essentially maintaining the status quo, keeping and strengthening its security commitments to its Asian allies while offering support to other non-aligned nations threatened by a rising China.

The United States should make sure not to send the wrong signals to China. Beijing considers America, the dominant power, to be in decline and believes in its own capacities to fill what it sees as a developing void.  China’s economic growth and military modernization, combined with existing American commitments elsewhere in central Asia and American economic downturn, have given China the idea that its time has come.  Despite this confidence, the Chinese leadership has misjudged how its neighbors will react to its moves within the region, and when states fail to understand the geopolitical environment, wars sometimes result.

U.S. rhetoric should avoid talk about reducing security commitments or military capabilities, especially in a domestic political environment which is debating budget reductions and what role America should play in the world. In addition, the United States should ensure it has clear lines of communication into China. Resuming military-to-military contacts between the two nations would be a good start.

The United States will face a difficult decision in coming years on how to encourage or discourage Japanese rearmament. Japan’s release of the Chinese captain has sparked right-wing protests in Japan.  Japan has also expanded its military capabilities in recent years and discussed significantly altering its constitution to permit further expansion. At some point, Japan will decide whether it will continue to rely on America for the bulk of its defense. The extent to which Japan rearms should be discussed extensively with the United States and Japan’s other regional allies. The time for laying the groundwork for such a conversation is now, while there is time for sound strategic thinking and long-term preparation, instead of waiting for crisis to strike again before facing these questions.

This is a perfect example of why there is still great demand for American hard power in the world. The U.S. military’s ability to contribute to security in the region is a major reason why America continues to be welcomed by many allies. Whether it is taking the lead in dealing with North Korea, balancing against China, or maintaining the sea-lanes of communication, U.S. power fills many important security roles in Asia.

Craig Caruana is a PAI Fellow in National Security Affairs.

Earlier in the week, the United States planned to reopen talks with Iran about its nuclear program. The United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China decided to once again propose a “phased approach” for nuclear talks with Iran. In this plan, Iran would be supplied with enriched fuel strictly for purposes of a research reactor in Tehran, so long as Iran ships most of its stockpile of uranium to Russia and France. President Ahmadinejad was openly receptive to reopening peace talks for a while but has recently and suddenly rejected the idea.

President Ahmadinejad’s recent actions raise new questions concerning his true intentions and raise speculation on what he’s doing behind the scenes. Why would the president of a country who is already under global watch because of its past suspicious behavior be so fickle in international interactions? It seems as though President Ahmadinejad is playing games with the world. Iran recently released Sarah Shourd, one of three captured hikers long held by Iran without cause, under the uncertain pretense that it was a “humanitarian gesture.” It has been a year since jailing her and her companions, so why now? Could he be trying to divert attention away from developments in Iran’s nuclear program? Many guesses could be made about the substantial attention President Ahmadinejad is creating, but his true intentions are not clear.

The United States should keep Iran high on its priority list. It is of public interest to continue to investigate Iran’s nuclear program. It is important not to let President Ahmadinejad’s antics divert attention from the most important issues. There is purpose to all political action, and the United States should keep in mind the several real intentions of President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime.  Importantly, President Obama did well to distinguish between the Iranian government’s ruling leadership and the majority of the Iranian nation.  It is the humanitarian duty of the world to make such distinctions if the two groups do not truly identify with one another. Notably, the UN Security Council’s sanctions have expressly aimed not to punish the Iranian people with economic or social sanctions, but to punish the Iranian government with sanctions that may most directly affect them (mainly military sanctions). The world must not be fooled by President Ahmadinejad’s diversions; to remain focused on eradicating Iran’s nuclear program and attempting to ease tensions through diplomacy is most important during this time of heightened attention.

Jessica Hredzak is PAI’s Intern in Middle Eastern Affairs.