Why Won't Iraqis Fight?
January 31, 2007
Executive Director's Note: PAI put out an open call to our Intern staff for articles on their life experiences. This article is from the perspective of one of them who served a seven month tour in Iraq. He has since returned home and is continuing his studies at a Wisconsin University.
During my seven-month tour of Iraq, with the Marines, I noticed some troubling obstacles standing in the way of a victory in Iraq. I was present in Iraq from September 13, 2004, through March 31, 2005. As you notice, those dates are when two very important elections took place. The first was the 2004 Presidential election here in the States. The second was the election of Iraq's own government. I mention these dates because of the emotional swing that took place in one of the most troubled areas in Iraq. This was a clear sign to me that a prolonged and committed stance was needed in order to completely gain the trust of the Iraqi population.
I doubt you will here this from many officers or from many politicians because of the unique position such a statement takes, but for me there is nothing to be gained or lost. I am just here telling you this tale through the eyes of a squad leader who dealt intimately with the every day affairs of the Iraqi people in my area of responsibility. I was in charge of leading patrols out of our Forward Operating Base for many reasons. I got to involve my squad with both affairs of the local population, and that of the lives of the rural inhabitants and smaller villages. I can honestly say that this was a very trying and growing experience, both for me and for the Marines in my squad.
Upon entering into this hostile nation, both culturally and physically, I saw, first hand, the creations of a dictator. I saw the ravage of nature that had been created by a ruler that ruled by the sword and not by reason. For the first part of my deployment I was attached to the unit we were replacing, both for the purpose of orientation, and also so as to become familiar with the tactics that were useful. Good in idea, but bad in actual execution. Here I was a fresh grunt that knew only American values, shoved into a group of Marines who learned the worst part of the fighting. The impact these Marines had on me was irreversible in the concept of completing the mission of "hearts and minds." How was I to earn the trust of the people when I was, in the Iraqi's eyes, the evil invader from the West? According to the Marines that went before me, these people were as untrustworthy as any politician in Washington. I could only agree with them because of the situation, they had been here for fourteen months, after all, and I was only the replacement.
So now it was my battalion's turn to figure out a way to earn the trust of the people. The initial item on our list was to get out and learn the area, both geographic and personal. The first one was the easy part. We were given the opportunity to drive around on all the roads that we could find for the simple purpose of familiarizing ourselves with the area. The second part was the trying position. How were we to gain the trust of a war-torn people who only knew what they were told by their former leader, Saddam Hussein? I think this was really done by a trial and error process. Not unlike the President in his approach.
Upon the push into a little city, Yusifyah, we began to learn what was needed to be done in order to accomplish the mission set before us. We needed to show the people of Iraq that we were there to stay until the security of the nation was complete. I personally was in charge of many squad sized patrols to ensure the people of Yusifyah knew our intent. At first it was the same old story. Everyone in the city wanted us there but was no one was willing to help. This was because of the simple fact that after we left they or their family would be killed for helping the U.S., either by the insurgency or by Saddam's still prevalent Ba'ath party members. This dragged on for the first month and a half while we were in country. We had received our first number of casualties, and to be honest, the loss of much or the morale that we had come with. So what was holding these people back from helping us? The first few weeks in November reveled the answer to us.
Even though we weren't thinking about it, as our notions of time back home had been lost, the Presidential elections in November we upon us. In the aftermath, the news of President Bush being reelected showed new hope. On the very next day, on an average patrol, I had my very first Iraqi come up and start pouring information out. After speaking with him for about ten minutes, I noticed that most of my Marines were being approached by adults that seemed interested in helping the fight against the insurgents. All of the squads in my platoon had experienced the same reaction from the populace that ours did. So now we had gained the trust of a good number of Iraqis. Now we could actually experience the depths of the true feeling that was in the Iraqi cities.
Since now the people were coming to us, our local security patrols changed to PR patrols. This served us in a couple different aspects. It gave use a chance to really know the people we were fighting to protect, and it also gave them a chance to see the men and women behind the U.S. war machine. I think this really helped with dialogue between us. The more we conversed, the more we realized what was behind the non-existent relationship prior to the month of November. Clearly stated by the locals was the commitment the American people had shown they were willing to make to the cause of freedom. As one Iraqi man told me, it was not the Presidents' commitment that worried them; it was if the American people would stand behind him. This was also the feelings of many other Iraqi men that I talked to.
Now that our relationship had become an open dialogue, it seemed that we finally started dealing with the problems that the media was portraying: the Iraqi people not standing on their own. We had problem with the Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi Police, even getting the people to trust their own military, because of the corruption that had crippled the publics' view of them. So instead of letting the Iraqi National Guard do the fighting, we were the ones leading, and they were simply following and babysitting. We had both Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi Police members just walking off of post, we caught them stealing from the local markets, and we also caught them doing their own personal black ops against the local populace. I think this was due to a lack of leadership from the top down. I say this because the problems of corruption had leaked into the lower ranks. These were not only officers committing these crimes but also the enlisted men in uniform.
I can really say the resolution to this problem had everything to do with the Iraqi elections in late January because of the drastic change that took place during in their wake. There was a rejuvenated attitude toward a free Iraq. I could see it in the faces of the Iraqi National Guard, Iraqi Police and the Iraqi people. The Iraqi National Guard stopped walking off of post, the Iraqi Police actually stood up to small arms fire, and moreover the people of Iraq started approaching the Iraqi authorities instead of the U.S. military. This was a great step forward in the stability of Iraq. The country had finally taken its very own responsibilities and was acting like a civilized country does. By the time that my battalion was cycled back home we had accomplished something not many battalions had done: we pacified a once hostile environment. Our area of responsibilty had gone from being called the "Triangle of Death" to experiencing the fewest number of casualties in just seven months. That was an enormous accomplishment.
After I had returned home I learned the fate of this place I once called home. The day we left a car bomb had entered the base and exploded near our mess hall. Shortly after that the army ceased all activities in the area leaving the people to the fate that they predicted. I can only speculate, but I am sure it was the shortage of ground personnel. Every once and a while I would see on the T.V. a firefight that had broken out on the streets of our once peaceful city. So why was this happening? To me and my Marines who served there, the answer was very simple. We lost the trust of the people we were supposed to be freeing.
I think it is ignorance to think our bashing of the war and crying out for troop withdrawal has not reached the people of Iraq. Our President and the Congress are the number one talked about issues in Iraqi homes. Sure this fight has taken longer than expected, and cost more lives than any one would have liked, but I think this story should be proof of what is to come if we do not ensure a free Iraq at all costs. The respect and trust that Americans have around the world will be lost, and not only by Iraqis. We will lose the battle in Iraq and coincidentally lose the war on terror.
Trust is the key issue in this battle for freedom. The Iraqis in Yusifyah helped and fought because they knew we would not let them fall. So how do we, as Americans, expect the world to trust us when we are not by their side? It is time we took the lead back from the insurgency and Islamic fundamentalists around the world. Let us show the world that we are willing to sacrifice for what we believe in, freedom.
Why Won't Iraqis fight? was written by one of PAI's Intern Staff © PAI 2007.