The Revival of Islamic Terror in Africa
On July 11th, Al Shabab, the Somalia-based terrorist organization, killed 76 people watching the World Cup in Uganda. Al Shabab is a growing threat to Somalia, neighboring countries and the United States. It began as an insurgency against the Somali government but has since grown into a dangerous organization which is now capable of attacks beyond Somali borders. The attack in Uganda was the organization’s first attack outside of Somalia, but it will likely not be the group’s last. The Ugandan government is preparing itself for more terrorist attacks. Ethiopia may also be on Al-Shabab’s target list considering it has sent forces into Somalia and contributes to the ongoing peacekeeping operations.
The group was formed in 2004 as a military wing of the Islamic Court Union, which controlled much of Somalia before the Ethiopian invasion. Al-Shabab is estimated to have thousands of fighters. While Al-Shabab has always exhibited ties to Al-Qaeda, these ties have become more tangible since February 2010. Its chief, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, is a capable leader. One of the architects of the 1998 Tanzania and Kenya embassy bombings (this alone is key evidence of Al-Shabab’s ties to the core of Al Qaeda), he has been outspoken in his desire to implement Sharia law throughout Somalia. Many of the group’s members are veteran insurgents of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and many of these foreign fighters have greatly increased Al-Shabab’s capabilities and have served to intensify its extremism. The West should be concerned not only by Al-Shabab’s increasing operational capability but also by its success in recruiting fighters on U.S. soil. At least 20 American citizens are believed to have joined Al-Shabab thus far.
U.S. strategy against Al-Shabab must be multi-dimensional. It must emphasize finding, capturing and killing terrorists in Somalia without neglecting terrorism prevention at home. The U.S. has already launched Special Forces attacks against Al-Shabab in the past. It is necessary to increase these attacks in the short term while increasing military aid to Uganda and other African countries over the long term. It is in American interests for African nations to handle the bulk of counterterrorism operations on their own. The United States should employ its superior intelligence and precision strike capabilities to hunt the most important targets with UAVs and Special Operations teams according to the model that has worked so successfully in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition, there must be a realistic strategy for stabilizing Somalia in the long-term. Sharia law is not popular throughout Somalia, but much practical power is presently dominated by local warlords. The U.S. and Somali governments should begin by identifying warlords who are aligned with Al-Shabab for purely political, rather than religious, reasons and work to turn them against Al-Shabab. U.S. Special Operations forces train regularly in this mission and have been proven highly effective in similar historical settings.
The challenge against groups like Al-Shabab is an example of why fighting the Global War on Terrorism is so difficult. Often, the United States acts only after an organization is well established instead of striking while it is still developing. Somalia is a failed state whose local Islamist insurgency was low on America’s list of threats, but the insurgency opened its doors to foreign fighters who vastly improved Al-Shabab’s capability, turning it into an international threat. Even before the attacks took place, Kenya’s foreign minister, Moses Wetangula, said that America needed to do more in Somalia. The recent attacks justify his critique. Had more American-led resources been devoted to the region earlier, Al-Shabab might not have been able to develop into the dangerous force it is today.
The National Security section of the Weekly Political Forecast is written by PAI’s Analyst in National Security Affairs.
