The Pakistani Double Game
The London School of Economics released a report early this past week alleging that the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI), not only funds and trains Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan but plays an active and official role in the Taliban’s executive war council. If this report is accurate, the Pakistani military already possesses significant influence over Taliban military operations. Since the group’s formation in 1994, Pakistan has maintained an attachment to the Afghan Taliban. However, Pakistani involvement with the organization since 2001 has been increasingly secretive and elevated.
In the report, testimony from nine Taliban commanders and Afghan security officials and government ministers demonstrate the extent to which the ISI can and does control Taliban strategy in the region, specifically Afghanistan. These interviews provide evidence that ISI operatives are active in meetings of the Taliban leadership council that is believed to meet in the Pakistani town of Quetta several times a year. The Pakistan government and army have vehemently denied the report on all accounts.
Certain aspects of the report seem more believable than others. Considering the aforementioned testimonials, known Pakistani security interests in the region, and a relatively consistent body of evidence and intelligence that has been produced over the past sixteen years, it is virtually impossible to conclude that the Pakistani government plays no role in supporting the Taliban movement. However, the report raises as many questions as it answers. For example, some American policymakers are skeptical of the accuracy of the report because the document makes several sensational claims that U.S. intelligence has been unable to confirm.
Pakistan certainly has incentive to assert its influence in the region. With U.S. troops scheduled to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan next year, other powers in the region are looking to gain as much influence over the nation as possible.
Particularly difficult in terms of developing effective foreign policy on behalf of the United States is the complex nature of the security relationship between America and Pakistan. The Pakistani government has been a key U.S. ally since the September 11th attacks in fighting al-Qaeda, but the United States can hardly keep supporting a government that directly and officially supports the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
A second concern is the monetary assistance the United States has long provided to the Pakistani government. Because Pakistan apparently maintains at least some degree of a relationship with the Taliban, fears are rising as to how American money and equipment is being utilized. Last year, Congress passed a bill proposed by Senator John Kerry to send $7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid alone to Pakistan over the next five years. What was once considered to be a landmark achievement to provide this nation with funding to build roads, schools and hospitals is now something of a liability. In addition to the nonmilitary aid given, the U.S. is scheduled to deliver eighteen F-16 fighter jets to the Pakistani government by the end of this month. While tough conditions and stipulations have been outlined regarding the ways these jets can be utilized, there are concerns throughout the region as to the sincerity of the promises made. India, in particular, is wary of Pakistani interests on their shared border. Thus, in addition to the concern about the Pakistani national government and various insurgencies, India has also expressed deep reservations about providing additional funding to Pakistan because of the history of conflict between those two nations. India worries that the same U.S. aid that empowers Pakistan to contribute to U.S. security interests can also be used to empower Pakistan in that decades-old rivalry.
Pakistan does not have a particularly clean record in implementation of its foreign aid. Last year, the Associated Press reported that between 2002 and 2008, only about $500 million out of $6.6 billion in U.S. military aid allotted to Pakistan was actually utilized for the tasks assigned. This repeated misuse of aid and the renewed concern about intimate Pakistani military ties to the Taliban raise a warning about the effectiveness of existing American foreign policy there and about whether the United States is really getting what it is paying for.
The United States cannot afford to undermine its own causes by providing aid to a security partner in ways that perpetuate a cycle of lies. The way we aid Pakistan in pursuit of our mutual security interests needs to be immediately reconsidered given the overwhelming evidence presented in the London School of Economics report. Specifically, we need to do a better job conditioning aid on incentives that make the Pakistani military align its actions with American interests, as opposed to the status quo in which the Pakistanis are able to welcome our aid even as they take hedging measures that negatively affect our mutual interests.
The Foreign Policy section of the Weekly Political Forecast is written by PAI’s Special Analyst for Foreign Affairs.
