The Political Impact of Iran’s Youth And the Future of the Iranian Democracy
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The Political Impact of Iran’s Youth
And the Future of the Iranian Democracy
Major J. Prokopowicz, United States Army;
Visiting Research Fellow, Pax Americana Institute.
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are solely those of Major Prokopowicz; they do not reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, those of the US Government or US Armed Forces.
“It strikes me often while I am in Iran that were [American] Christian Evangelicals to take a tour of Iran toady, they might find the model for an ideal society they seek in America. Replace Allah with God, Mohammad with Jesus, keep the same public and private notions of chastity, sin, salvation, and God’s will, and a Christian Republic is born.” -Ayatollah Mohammad Khatami
Revolutionary Diffusion on the Youth
Youth movement power in Iran is certainly not a new concept. In the 1970s, an expansive, international youth student network facilitated Ayatollah Rullohah Khomeini’s revolution. Returning from studying abroad, Iranian students smuggled letters, speech transcripts, and lessons derived from Khomeini and his inner circle. This enabled Khomeini’s followers to seize the underground information environment, fostering his return from exile and the founding of the Shia Islamic Republic based on Khomeini’s velayat-e fiqih (rule of the jurisprudent) philosophy.5 During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini’s government sponsored a nationwide procreation initiative intended to fill gaps left by Iran’s “martyred” soldiers.6 As planned, the procreation initiative rendered a large baby boom. Public education and national literacy campaigns insured the “Children of the Revolution” possessed skills and knowledge needed to enhance Iran’s collective potential.7 Not planned was accompanying dissention from within the baby boom. Quite simply, the regime has been unsuccessful in diffusing revolutionary ideas onto its youth. This is due to the youth holding a second-hand view of the Iranian Revolution, competition with technology, and the declining interest in religion.
Revolution: A Second-hand Concept. In perhaps a cruel ironic twist, a government founded in cooperation with revolutionary students now contends with its own student dissent. Much like the Shah in the 1970s, the Islamic Republic significantly controls multiple aspects of the nation, leaving youth angry or disenfranchised. This control, along with problematic political and economic situations, diminishes the relationship between the regime and the Iranian youth, leaving only religion and nationalism as nominally held commonalities.8
Being calculating and rational, the regime is not oblivious to the stirring emotions of its young populace.9 Perhaps out of pragmatic realization, or mirror imaging to its own revolutionary era, the regime grants minor, often tacit allowances in dispensation of social liberties.10 Still, the government is unsuccessful in connecting with its youth, demonstrated by occasional suppression and imprisonment of dissidents.11
Being concentrated enclaves of young people, universities remain the principle, physical friction points for regime-youth relations.12 These young adults, having lived their lives under the firm grip and prying eyes of the regime, develop clever methods to circumvent and countermand the government’s societal control. From a political perspective, students seek more pluralism from Iran’s society. Their intent is not to change the regime. Rather, students seek more pluralism within the regime’s confines, a concept long suppressed by constitutional machinations.13 Political dissent, along with economic decline, instigated significant campus political mobilization from the educated Iranian student body, prompting the government to ban university student elections.14
From a cultural viewpoint, Iranian students and young people develop avenues for typical student behavior, particularly concerning western-style music and entertainment. Young Iranians audaciously defy state dress codes in public, often in sight of civil authorities.15 These include T-shirts and jeans for men, and multi-colored, strategically placed hijabs (head scarves) for women.16 In the religious city of Qom, authorities suppress, or at the least frown upon, young clerical students listening to Iranian pop music. In order to bypass possible censors, students gently rephrase “music” to “chanting,” falsely attributing religious or meditation connotations.17 Also, holding parties for the sake of partying is also prohibited. While it is not uncommon for teens and twenty-somethings to assemble in a social setting, they must mask it with religious overtones. However, late-night parties are common in Iran, ranging from elaborate graduation or holiday parties of the wealthy to underground gatherings, drag racing, and activities evoking images from the film “American Graffiti.”18 Dancing, alcohol consumption, promiscuity, and drug use are known to occur at some parties, corresponding to activities of American counterparts.19
Dissidence also resides among university faculties, enough to inspire unconventional approaches in teaching forbidden subjects. In her memoir, Reading Lolita in Tehran, Azar Nafisi describes her efforts to teach banned, foreign authors (such as Hemingway and Nabokov) to a select group of female students.20 Nafisi challenges the regime in two ways: through providing censored material to the youth, and by empowering young women in a subversive “feminist” manner. Even though Iranian women carry more rights than other Muslim countries, they are still regarded as second-class citizens, and legally hold the rights of half a man.21 Nafisi is one of many Iranians using unconventional methods to communicate marginalized ideas to the youth. However, new forms of subversion pushed the regime’s information control to the brink.
Competing With Technology. Although intended to empower the Islamic Republic, state-sponsored education and literacy campaigns provided Iranian youth with skills for innovative dissent. There is little doubt that computer technology is the most significant innovation affecting Iran’s youth. The facts testify on the impact: seventy-three percent of youth have access to satellite television; and Iran boasts the Middle East’s highest proportion of internet users (over thirty-six percent).22 Further, with Farsi now the third most popular language on the Internet,23 and with cellular phones and text messaging rampant, the regime now must compete with rhetoric in the ever-expanding cyberspace, particularly against an estimated one hundred thousand “blogs,” or Internet journals.24
It’s not the quantity of the blogs that irks the regime, rather, their content. In her excellent book, We Are Iran, Nasrin Alavi presents a cross-section of the Iranian “blogosphere,” covering everything including pop-culture, politics, religion, sex, dating, and numerous other topics of young-minded interest. In her own words, Alavi explains:
“One of the major attractions of blogging in Iran is that it enables young people to bypass many of the strict social codes imposed on them by the theocratic regime. The Internet makes it easy to socialize, flirt, tell irreverent jokes, arrange dates and keep in touch. Popular young bloggers…offer us a snapshot of the underground landscape of their lives.”25
Naturally, politics dominates numerous blogs, and as Alavi contends, this medium is virtually no holds barred. Some cast their leadership in unflattering caricatures (comparisons to pigs and “pimps” are not uncommon).26 Some express anger against the enforcement of regime policies, and others wax extensively on popular culture.27 Most significant for Iran’s political landscape is blogs calling for more representation and pluralism in the government. For bloggers, there seems to be a common thread: hatred of everything the government loves and love for everything the government hates.28
A major internet-based subversion lies within Iranian feminism. In 1979, as part of initiatives to purify Iran, Khomeini decreed that all women must cover with a hijab (veil).29 While enforcement of this measure vacillated over the past thirty years, Alavi reveals that blogging enables women to virtually “unveil,” and express themselves freely, creating a possible knock-on effect.30 As previously mentioned, Iran does not afford women equal legal rights as men. However, women have equal voice on the Internet, and are not afraid to express their thoughts on dating, attire, and legal standing. Having been marginalized in other aspects of society, Iranian women proved adaptable, and blogs effectively serve as a virtual “rally point.”31
So how does the regime compete? So far the regime maintains efforts to censor and event attempts to substitute with blogs of its own. The government claims the successful – often harsh – imprisonment of many bloggers, and boasts the filtering of more than ten million websites.32 The regime also fights back, sponsoring, encouraging, an even rewarding bloggers who uphold regime-friendly “Islamic values.”33 Yet given the immense number of blog sites (some originating from expatriates),34 censorship and substitution yields the same effect as a children’s “Whack-A-Mole” game; when one mole gets hit, another pops up elsewhere. Despite attempts to censor, blogging remains a key outlet of expression, and its increase is an indicator of anger fomenting in this crucial demographic.
Secularization and Stratification
In 1979, Ayatollah Rullohah Khomeini’s vision of a utopian, Islamic Republic ostensibly came true. While his goal was the creation of a society with high Islamic morality and ethics, harsh application of his religious and political ideals spurred resentment from succeeding generations.35 While rhetoric in 1789-France expressed that revolutions devour their children. In Iran, resulting popular secularization and separation proves the reverse is true: the children are devouring the revolution.36
Secularization: Losing their Religion. Prominent Islamic scholar and Shia cleric Hadi Ghabel, reflecting on 25 years of rule by Iranian clergy, claims the revolution “has not made Islam stronger, but it has brought about a decline in the position of the clergy and religion in society.”37 The source of this decline originates in Iran’s paradoxical administration of government. Ironically, in an attempt to instill religion in society, transformations of the political system introduced a secularization of Islam intended to account for issues beyond Islamic doctrine.38 After trickling down to the populace, these results create a hybrid attitude of state religion. Many claim to be “practicing Muslims,” but their actions and attitudes suggest otherwise.39
As youth continue to balance modernity with traditional Islamic values, social and societal changes reveal evidence of attitude shifts. First, women are waiting longer for marriage, as the average age of newly married women spiked to 27.9 years (up from 23 years in 1997).40 This indicates more women are independent-minded and serve more in the workforce. Also, waiting for marriage means less children. After a decade of state-encouraged reproduction, Iran’s under-30 demographic apparently does not want as many children. Focusing on 1986 to 2001, the annual Iranian birth rate plummeted from 3.2 percent to 1.2 percent.41 The current 2009 estimate now stands at 1.6 percent.42 Further, while the Islamic Republic boasts a 98% Muslim practice rate,43 fewer than 3% of youth regularly attend Friday prayers.44 Fewer males seek to align themselves with a Marja’ taqlid (“source of imitation”), a Shia practice in which followers recognize a specific cleric for mentorship and guidance.45 Most are likely encouraged by exposure to western-ideas and thought, and these trends suggest the Islamic Republic’s evolution into a much different entity, with religion slowly receding to the background. Politically, secularization encourages youth to seek ownership of their religion and contest restrictions established by the theocracy. While aforementioned data indicates a secular transition, Iranian youth are not secular; religion remains a powerful driving force in all societal demographics.46 Yet, as Jared Cohen explains, hard-line clerics and politicians tainted religion by making it an extension of policy, prompting youth to seek private salvation.47 Clearly rigid, clerical application of religion creates an unintended, secular side effect. As New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof expressed, “In much of the world, young Muslims are increasingly religious, but compulsive Islam has soured some Iranians on religion.”48
Stratification: Picking Sides. A demographic of over forty million people features diverse opinions and factions, usually deriving from role or background. Examining varied opposition groups, along with regime loyalists, reveals distinct and nuanced differences, all significant and vital in shaping a generation’s rise to power in Iranian society.
The Opposition. While labor unions, women’s rights groups, and intellectuals all contribute to an immense opposition, student organizations potentially hold the greatest force against the regime.49 In 1979, roughly 160,000 students attended public universities. In 2006, that number ballooned to over two million, including a significant increase in female enrollment. This provides a vast and, regenerating recruitment pool for student associations, propagating issues both on and off campuses.50 Ali Afshari and H. Graham Underwood effectively stratify these associations, illustrating four types that test the limits of the regime’s authority. The first types are arts associations, that generally seek to entertain the student body via movies, music, and performances. With frequent exhibits of subversive thought, the regime subjects these associations to extreme censorship – which drastically increased under President Mahmood Ahmedinejad in 2005.51
Student publications comprise Afshari’s and Underwood’s second group, which experienced significant growth during President Mohammed Khatami’s administration from 1997 to 2005. Espousing informed and anti-regime rhetoric, these groups also felt the pressure of Ahmedinejad’s Prokopowicz Pax Americana Institute 8
censorship efforts, either through reduced funding or outright prohibition.52 The third group is student trade unions, which are similar to student councils and governments in the West. These also experienced tremendous expansion during Khatami’s administration, as larger student bodies led to increased student representation. Politicized debates and opposition to policy led to faculty purges. Student suspensions also increased under President Ahmedinejad, ultimately leading to the aforementioned ban on student elections. 53
Afshari’s and Underwood’s final group comprises of political organizations. Dating back to the 1930s, the authors contend that these groups are not simply part of a “youth culture,” but are a main organizational pillar in Iranian civil society.54 They maintain that half of the political groups are democratic in nature, with pro-regime, socialist-communist, and Islamic groups holding their own minority blocs.55 Mostly based in and around campuses in Tehran, pro-democratic groups seek increased pluralism, liberal thought, human rights, and permanent separation of religious authority and government. Notably, pro-democratic groups seek radical reform and constitutional change through peaceful means.56 Since the majority of these groups are unofficial and operate underground, they receive little official support.57
The Loyalists. Understanding that the majority of Iran’s youth is decidedly anti-regime, a commonly held western misconception comes from images of youth chanting “Death to America” on CNN.58 These images are no accident, as the regime’s information ministry stages demonstrations in order to convey a unified, mobilized stance against the West. In reality, these “loyalists” are more loyal to enhancing their status in the eyes of the regime, and, as Jared Cohen explains, they come from five echelons of society.59 The first pool of loyalists comes from families of slain soldiers from the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. As previously discussed, the regime went through great measures to heal demographic fissures caused by this conflict, one of which included the care, education and employment of left-behind children. Through this program, the regime indoctrinates this select group from early age and establishes a ready stream of support.60
The next echelon derives from the fringes of society. In 2005 Mahmood Ahmedinejad, while not intending irony, ran for President as a regime-sponsored populist candidate. Using rhetoric identical to Josef Goebbels, Ahmedinejad garnered significant support by blaming western society for Iran’s woes, propelling him to the presidency in August of that year.61 The third come from true believers, the youth who internalize the regime’s religious governmental philosophy. These are the <3 percent who actually attend Friday prayers and train for clerical duties to fulfill their personal and professional ambitions. The fourth group is what Cohen calls the “innate believers,” or families of the ruling elite. Nested in privilege and position, these youth consider themselves unofficial heirs to their fathers’ leadership, and hold no reservation for their support of the regime.62 Finally, the last group comes from Iran’s military and security forces. Whether serving in the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or as part of the Basij63 (state volunteer militia), these youth enjoy the status and prestige that elude others as civilians.64 While most youth eschew military service, those who do serve are desperate and resolved to perform the government’s “dirty work” in exchange for status.65
Though a distinct minority, loyalists do provide a strong constituency for the regime. The regime’s investment in loyalist fostering and training indicates their awareness of a growing youthful dissent. Understanding the opposition, the regime hopes to have just enough followers to sustain their government and uphold their interpretation of Islamic values.
Implications of Youth
As Iran’s post-revolutionary generation matures, questions arise about its role in Iran’s future. As a societal configuration, Iran ironically resembles the United States more than any other Middle Eastern state, and this rising generation, armed with western influence, will significantly change Iran’s national landscape. However, before western leaders begin pining for Iranian democracy, all must consider Iran’s failed democratic attempts, collective desired changes, and strong sense of nationalism.
Democracy and Foreign Intervention. Historical attempts at true Iranian democratic pluralism are testimonies of futility, due largely to external interference. The initial significant attempt came in 1906, in response to intense popular pressure, the ruling Qajar monarchy granted constitutional reform, and allowed the creation of a national parliament (Majles).66 However, Imperial Russia, motivated by oil procurement, facilitated the return of the Qajar monarchy just two years later, effectively limiting Majles legitimacy.67
Another example of failed pluralism came with the removal of nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953. Popularly elected in 1951, Mossadeq sought to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, much to the disappointment of Great Britain and the United States. Britain promptly cut Iran out of the global oil market, causing internal economic collapse. Further, the United States inflated the threat of Soviet communist expansion, encouraging the clergy to move from Mossadeq’s camp.68 Reza Shah Pahlavi and the military, bolstered by the United States, presented a realistic alternative that appealed to the public more than Mossadeq’s idealism.69 The result was a military coup sponsored by the western Allies, placing the Shah and his cohorts in full power of the regime.70 One year later, the Shah’s government signed a new agreement with western oil companies, setting the stage for a booming petro-economy.71
Both of these examples provide a vital lesson. They remain prevalent in contemporary Iranian discourse; to some, these events seem to have only occurred yesterday – Mossadeq is an icon to numerous youthful bloggers.72 Both involve nascent democratic operations upended by foreign intervention, usually in the interest of profit and oil. Despite ostensible altruism, Iranians will likely view any foreign democratization efforts with extreme suspicion.
The Constitution Begs to Differ. From 1997 to 2005, Iran experienced a sort-of -reformation under President Mohammad Khatami. Under his tenure, laws on public behavior relaxed, and a reversal of isolationist foreign policy brought business and tourism to the Islamic republic.73 In two elections, Khatami won over 70 percent of the vote, with members from most societal factions -including the military- lending their support.74 Khatami even once had a United States President sit in an audience – Bill Clinton at the UN – and was the champion of the rising youth population.75
So what happened? Members of Khatami’s base (left-leaning and liberal Iranians) were greatly disappointed by the pace of his reforms, and his unwillingness to take on hard-liners.76 Students expected his support after regime elements suppressed demonstrators in July 1999, but instead, Khatami acquiesced to prevent more violence.77 After announcing retirement without endorsing a possible successor, political opponents quickly mobilized. Ahmedinejad’s populist campaign took great advantage by focusing on Iran’s diminished economic situation.78
In actuality, Khatami and his reforms held little chance for success due to strict constitutional frameworks. Ultimate power rests with the Guardianship Council, which selects candidates for office, holds absolute veto power, and operates under the charge of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Husseini Khameni.79 Further, the conservative Guardianship Council staged a sort of “parliamentary coup,” sought to limit parliamentary power by any possible means.80 They demonstrated their power by disqualifying numerous reformist parliamentary candidates, to the wholesale rejection of multiple progressive legislative acts.81 Witnessing Khatami’s inability to establish any real genuine reform left youth disenfranchised.
What do the youth want, and what should the West do? With such tight control by the conservative leadership, the sizable youth majority stands a de facto opposition.82 As expressed earlier, youth seek more pluralism, and the most fervent democracy advocates seek representation without “prefixes or suffixes.”83 While bloggers reveal a yearning for more pluralism and ease of restrictions, there are two key areas where the youth and regime hold common ground.
First is an aversion of violence. The young generation still feels the effects of the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, with monuments and commemorative infrastructure dominating the urban landscape.84 American combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as effective propaganda tools for the government, and most Iranians would rather have the regime stay in power than fight a war.85 Nationalism runs strong within Iranian youth, and most Iranians feel entitled to nuclear weapons as a means of defense and regional hegemony.86 As Cohen remarks:
“The nuclear issue transcends attitudes of both regime and youth, as both believe Iran has the right to master this key technology.”87
This support goes only so far, as nuclear weapons would only empower the regime. Most youth would gladly suppress nuclear aspiration in exchange for the regime’s abdication.88 Still, the regime will likely exploit this shared view, and use it to mobilize support for nuclear weapons. Any unity will reaffirm the regime’s leadership, and obtaining these weapons guarantees more power.
The second key area revolves around external influence. Iran witnessed several attempts of democracy thwarted by external powers, and all generations keep these events at their collective memory’s forefront. Jared Cohen suggests the Iranian youth inclination toward technology and western culture as an access point for information and propaganda campaigns.89 He supports this argument on the basis that technology can bypass the regime and police apparatus, and encourage youth-to-youth networking.90 Yet Cohen, along with Alavi, and more agree on at least one key issue: the youth of Iran will undoubtedly stand with its regime against foreign aggressors.91
Therefore, the best recommendation for the West is to tread lightly, and maintain close watch. Any overt notion of interference would likely embolden the oppressive regime, not weaken it. Technology and information already provided Iran’s youth with the most significant tools needed to increase pluralism. There is no need to push any western-sponsored democratic reform. One day, members of the current regime will be gone. While they train their handpicked successors, they now they face significant opposition. Hopefully, western nations have the wherewithal for restraint, and the ability to assist upon genuine invitation.
Conclusion
As of this writing, the Obama administration expressed interest in opening serious negotiation with Iran, going so far as to suggest removing uranium enrichment as a precondition.92 While time will tell on the state of United States-Iranian relations, the Iranian youth will likely welcome this détente, and hopefully benefit from improved relations with the West. What we understand is that the Iranian youth population is growing up, and growing more eager to establish itself. After examining the Iranian Revolution’s effect on the young, and highlighting demographic characteristics of the youth, we understand that Iran’s under-30 crowd holds significant implications for their nation’s future. Iran’s youth is indeed a force to be reckoned with. They want a voice, and they seek change. Yet, they want all of this on their own terms. While Pete Townshend and The Who probably did not have Iran’s youth on their mind, their hit song hints like a foreshadowing anthem. Iran’s younger generations do have their own ambitions, and would very much like to see suppressive forces fade away.
References
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Prokopowicz Pax Americana Institute 15
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